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“. . . we must, and ought to, act only upon convictions justified by reason and experience, 
which have been passed through the crucible of analysis; in a word, we must act 
rationally, not insanely, and not as though in dream and delirium, that we may not do 
harm, that we may not ill-treat and ruin a man.” 
 
Fyodor Dostoevsky 
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This essay argues that the term rebellion applies to two similar but distinguishable 
experiences representative of the limits to human action and capacity.  The political rebel 
is a man who rebels against an oppressive political regime.  Opposing him is the 
metaphysical rebel whose action is inspired by a grievance against the nature of existence 
generally, as a human being, which he has interpreted to be oppressive.  These 
contradicting inspirations are matched by juxtaposing consequences, exemplified through 
a literary analysis of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s novels, and a historical analysis of Václav 
Havel and the Velvet Revolution. 
 1 
Introduction: Terms, Concepts, and a Voegelinian Framework 
 Men in rebellion proclaim that their cause is driven by the truth, but men are 
imperfect creatures and capable of being incorrect; consequently there are those who 
rebel for the truth and there are those who rebel against it. If every proclamation of truth 
is not actually true, then there must be some measure to distinguish between rebels 
inspired by the truth and those who only profess it.  Or is the solution to the quandary the 
annihilation of this term – the truth; the reorganization of understanding so as everything 
is true?  ‘Certainly not,’ the reader might be moved to object; and the thought has flashed 
across the insightful mind: ‘or else the criminal has a right to his crime.’  The reader, 
insightful or not, has been moved to objection.  The criminal, however, refuses to be 
moved in the same way.  The rebellion of the reader and the rebellion of the criminal 
represent a forthright differentiation amongst the lot of man.   
 Rebellion is a broad term.  It infers both the reader’s reluctance to accept a 
questionable proposition, and the criminal’s eagerness for it; but also it implies the 
reader’s acceptance of a sound idea, as well as the criminal’s recalcitrance against it.  
Both parties have a desired end, and in seeking that end they are both in opposition of the 
antagonizing idea, and active in their quest to reconcile life to their conceptions of how it 
should be.  Hence Albert Camus opens his study The Rebel by giving us the very broad 
definition of a rebel as “a man who says no, but whose refusal does not imply a 
renunciation.”
1
  This is an apposite definition; it recognizes the breadth of the term with 
which we are concerned and connotes an antagonism between juxtaposing ideas of what 
might be believed to be good.   
                                                
1
 Albert Camus, The Rebel.  Vintage Books, New York: 1956. pg 13 
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The applicability of the term to opposing conceptions of life implies opposing 
consequences for those conceptions.  The effect of rejection does not leave man in an 
empirical abyss.  Camus is saying that a rebel remains a human being in affirmation of 
something.  This thesis argues that the nature of the rebel’s affirmation foreshadows the 
consequences of the idea he believes.       
 In other words, the nature of the rebellion depends upon what is denied by the 
rebel, and what is in turn accepted.  In the example of the reader and the criminal the 
conflicting interests are qualitatively different in nature, lending to the ability to 
categorically distinguish between their pursuits, and consequently between their 
consequences.  The reader would be inspired to say no to a malignantly contrived 
political institution because of an injustice it might impose, even if it is not he who 
suffers from its imposition.  He affirms his belief in freedom, and renounces a political 
order for inhibiting his belief.  On the other hand, the criminal rejects the very belief 
which inspires the reader.  The unrelenting pursuit of mundane satiety abnegates the 
belief in the freedom of men.
2
  The reader’s unselfish but fair affirmation collides with 
the criminal’s desire for immanent conquest; hence the conflict of rebellion is therefore 
always a situation in which the rebel is forced to decide between two qualitatively 
different claims to truth, one grounded in mundane satiety, and the other in that which 
inspires the belief in freedom.  
Both scenarios lead into apparent paradoxes. The reader might find himself 
persecuted for objecting, if because of political conditions freedom is not a tolerable 
                                                
2
 “Mundane satiety” is a term used throughout the essay, inspired from Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn’s The First 
Circle: “In order to understand the nature of happiness, we first have to analyze satiety.” (Solzhentsyn, 
Aleksandr, trans. By Whitney, Thomas, The First Circle.  Bantam Books, New York: 1968. pg. 38)  It is 
also reliant on Eric Voegelin’s persistent use of “mundane” as a juxtaposition of “transcendental.”   
 3 
notion in the society in which he lives.  His family, his property, and his existence as a 
human being might become threatened for his rebellion.  Worldly things, however 
precious, become the objects which the reader would be forced to abandon given his 
circumstance.  While the political malefactors might face similar threats through the 
response of society to their encroachments, their rebellion against freedom is 
distinguishable because facilitated by the rejection of the motivation which inspires one 
to respect the freedom of others.  
 Jan Pato ka has said simply: “there are some things worth suffering for.”
3
  
Pato ka could not articulate himself any more clearly than to qualify suffering as 
worthwhile for some things.  His ambiguous claim was not made out of inconclusiveness 
but out of truth.  He sought to validate an experience of the soul that cannot be equated to 
any particular worldly qualification; his attunement was to the ineffable and eternal.  If he 
had thought it worthwhile to suffer in order to drink fine wine, for example, he would 
have written to that effect.  The tenets of his inspiration, however, like those of the reader, 
are of a freedom which cannot oblige men to suffer for any specific worldly good.   
Similarly, Václav Havel has defined something in the also ambiguous but 
appropriate terminology of “authentic existence.”
4
  The ambiguity of this terminology 
suggests that truth is indeed incompatible with a convenient definition  that if it could 
easily be defined man’s experience would cease to be “authentic.”  It implies that truth 
can be reconciled with something of a shared experience amongst men, if what is shared 
is only the authenticity of our own unique experiences.  This experience is revealed in 
                                                
3
 Ellis Sandoz, The Politics of Truth and Other Untimely Essays: The Crisis of Civic Consciousness.  
University of Missouri Press, Columbia and London: 1999. pg 10 
4
 Václav Havel, ed. Vladislav, Jan.  Living in Truth. Faber and Faber, London: 1986.  pg 57 
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ambiguous language because the qualifications for it are derived from an attunement to 
eternal things which necessarily defy worldly concretion. 
 Such language does not imply that any experience fulfills the qualifications of an 
“authentic existence.”  Rather, if a criminal usurps from society in order to satisfy his 
own cravings, his usurpations suggest that no one affected by those misgivings remains in 
a state of authenticity.  The criminal’s conquest, as a collection of goods stolen from 
those around him, is not really “authentic.”  It is manufactured by his turning of others’ 
experiences and goods into his own.  Likewise, neither do those from whom he stole 
experience authenticity; their experiences in life are no longer theirs; their experiences, 
too, are a creation of the criminal. 
 The dichotomous motivations of the reader and the criminal are manifested in the 
ways in which our societies are organized.  The criminal is intent on recreating 
fundamental components of our experiences, but within a world that has already been 
created for us and exists as a given.  The impossibility of creating a world that has 
already been created is implacable.  If such a rebel obtains power within a society the 
whole of society is affected, he attempts to change the nature of it in a way consistent 
with the usurpations he makes for his advantage.  The consequence is that the 
experiences understood to be “authentic” become eradicated and replaced by the 
criminal’s manufactured experiences.  But a manufactured experience is still an 
experience.   
 This experience is a vitiation of the authentic one; it may foster the rebellion 
against this manufactured experience, in a quest to rediscover authenticity.  The political 
ramifications of this discovery lead men to form institutions respectful of the fundamental 
 5 
need inherent to the maintenance of authenticity; namely: the freedom to discover and 
maintain it.  
 This thesis’ examination of this phenomenon revolves around the juxtaposing 
demands of these two rebels, and of the interrelation between them.  It accordingly seeks 
to divide rebellion into two more specific categories: the metaphysical rebel who seeks to 
create, and the political rebel who seeks authenticity.  Let us define and clarify these 
terms, before moving into an account of the criteria used to establish them.         
 As Pato ka and Havel exemplify, political rebellion occurs in concordance with 
the type of truth experienced as a movement of the soul, and when that movement pits 
man in opposition to a malevolent, unjust, unnecessary, and criminal political imposition.  
Political rebellion is coined for the specific purpose of referring to the rebellion against 
unjust and unnecessary impositions, and not used in reference to any rebellion that might 
involve action in the political realm.  Political rebellion therefore occurs when the 
responsible party for a grievance is a politically sovereign entity.  The term political 
rebellion conveys the idea of a rebellion for a grievance that can be legitimately directed 
against a regime.  The idea that there is a legitimate or fair role for politics to play in the 
organization of man’s affairs is unoriginal.  I would like to base my considerations of 
legitimacy on the social contract theory of John Locke.     
Locke proposed that men come together under the social contract for the purpose 
of “quitting the state of nature” and preserving “their lives, liberties . . . and property.”
5
  
We subject ourselves to the prerogatives of our rulers for these purposes, any violation of 
these premises by the ruler constituting “encroachments which prejudice or hinder the 
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  Violations of this sort are tyrannical acts and violations of the social 
contract which revert the tyrant to the state of nature and give the society the opportunity 
and right to reify the social contract.  Revolutions of this sort can thus be seen as 
legitimate restorations of the social contract and are referred to in this essay as inspired 
by political rebellion.  It is not the revolutionaries who rebel against the social contract, 
but rather the government which had perverted its contractual powers.
7
   
 In revolution we have a similar term to rebellion, but one that extends beyond it.  
Rebellion refers, in this essay, to the spirited defiance that occurs within individuals, or 
within small groups that cannot affect the larger political setting.  Revolutions, however, 
occur within a group or groups of people and culminate in political change. Revolutions 
do, however, manifest from rebellions; they are movements of individuals rebelling 
collectively.  The terms are specifically related in that the ideals of the rebellion will 
affect the institutions wrought by the revolution.   
Change, however, can be brought about in either a restorative or renovative 
manner; a distinction noticed by Hannah Arendt which helps to develop the idea of 
rebellion as a broad phenomenon of juxtaposing interrelations.  Consistent with the 
notion of restoring the social contract, revolution was originally understood as a word 
that implies restoration.
8
    In modernity, however, the idea of revolution as a political 
movement in which a society or faction of a society attempts to impose a new-found right 
or duty onto society has taken hold, confusing the integrity of the term.
9
  Such 
                                                
6
 Ibid, pg. 346 
7
 Ibid, pg. 377 
8
 In Arendt’s words:“…its precise Latin meaning, designating the regular, lawfully revolving motion of the 
stars, which, since it was known to be beyond the influence of man and hence irresistible, was certainly 
characterized by neither newness nor by violence.  On the contrary, the word clearly indicates a recurring 
cylical movement.” (Hannah Arendt, On Revolution. The Viking Press, New York: 1965. pg 35) 
9
 Arendt, On Revolution, pgs. 34 -40 
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revolutions might be more appropriately understood as renovations, and cannot be 
considered as an effect of political rebellion, as rights heretofore unknown to the 
experiences of men cannot be the responsibility of politics.  Revolutions of this sort do 
not attempt to reinstate the social contract but to transfigure the meaning of it, to impose 
a new definition of societal obligation onto the area it controls.  In other words, 
revolutionaries who seek to replace tyrannical encroachments with impositions of their 
own are nothing more than rebels against social well-being themselves.  The purpose of 
the social contract is not restored in such a situation.  As Locke puts it: “For in all the 
states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law there is no freedom.  For 
liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which cannot be where there 
is no law.”
10
  The nature of the laws of a society reveals the intentions of its regime: if a 
regime seeks to preserve the freedom of those it rules its laws will reflect this desire.  If 
the rebels that make revolutions and the revolutions that precede regimes do not 
consciously seek this end, it will not manifest in political reality. 
Accordingly, this analysis will establish revolutions in terms of the consequence 
or historical manifestation of them, and categorize findings accordingly.  Revolutions 
will be divided between those which composed governments of law respectful of the 
freedoms inherent to the social contract, and those which merely changed the way in 
which society was oppressed.  The ultimate product will outline the necessary 
prerequisites or stipulations a revolution must adhere to if it is to successfully restore the 
Lockean notion of social contract and fulfill the demands of political rebellion as used in 
this essay.  It will only be revolutions that result in the institution of open and fair 
political systems that qualify as the consequence of political rebellions. 
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 Locke, Political Writings, pg. 289 
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 In this way rebellion and revolution are inextricably linked.  The motivating 
factors of a rebellion are reflected in the institutional changes sought through 
revolutionary action.  If a rebel proclaims, “I am oppressed,” turns this rebellion into a 
political movement and assumes political power only to turn around and become the 
oppressor, then something about the nature of his oppression is revealed through this 
action.   It was not really motivated by a sense of un-authenticity, but by a drive to 
redefine what authenticity may mean, which in turn corrupts that notion.  This insinuates 
that not every revolution, simply because it proclaims to achieve fairness for the society 
in which it occurs, results in the institution of open and fair political systems.  Laws must 
assume the humble role of maintaining “lives, liberties . . . and property.”
11
  Their 
fundamental task, therefore, is the assignment of preventing acts which encroach upon 
man’s equal right to “lives, liberties . . . and property.”  If a revolution is to be 
categorized as a political rebellion it must meet this criterion.  An example from the 
pages of history is appropriate.   
Legitimate revolution, inspired by political rebellion, occurs in Locke’s theory as 
a mechanism through which the rights provided by the social contract can be protected.  
For example, Sandoz frames England’s Glorious Revolution around the issue of 
“fundamental law” or “a law superior to even kings.”
12
  Fundamental law is a way of 
expressing that certain rights transcend the bounds of legitimate political authority and 
are fundamentally irrelevant to the ability of a regime to provide for the well-being of a 
society, and should therefore remain inaccessible to worldly authority.  Fundamental law 
entails those rights inherent to the social contract.   
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 Locke, Political Writings, pg. 325 
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 Ellis Sandoz, A Government of Laws.  Univesity of Missouri Press, Columbia and London: 2001. pg. 159 
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The validity of this concept was initially challenged in England in 1649 and 
settled in 1688.  In 1649 Oliver Cromwell was instrumental in the beheadings of the Earl 
of Strafford and King Charles I, the latter on grounds of “perverting his rule into a 
tyrannical power to rule according to his will.”
13
  The uprising that led to his execution 
was the result of the imposition of a new prayer book on Presbyterian Scotland.
14
  This 
act constituted a usurpation of fundamental law.  The means by which they attempted to 
address the tyrannical encroachment, or to institute the provisions defined by the social 
contract, was to instill “greater authority for the Parliament and an end to arbitrary royal 
rule.”
15
  This act was viewed as a restoration of fundamental law; Arendt notes: “the 
short-lived victory of this first modern revolution was officially understood as a 
restoration, namely as ‘freedom by God’s blessing restored. . . .’”
16
   
Again, in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, after the short-lived victory in 1649 
had resulted in the ultimate restoration of the monarchy, a bloodless coup was inspired by 
the tyrannical encroachments of James II.  He had “revoked the charters of many English 
towns, rejected the advice of Parliament, and aroused popular opposition by openly 
practicing Roman Catholicism.”
17
  The birth of his son and Catholic heir inspired the 
revolution which resulted in Mary II and William III ruling as constitutional monarchs, 
“accepting a Declaration of Rights that limited royal prerogatives and increased personal 
liberties and parliamentary powers.”
18
  In the English experience the process of 
revolution can be detected as a response to a formulation of laws that were not 




 Henretta, Brody, and Dumenil.  America: A Concise History, vol. 1: to 1877.  Bedford/ St. Martins, New 
York, Boston: 1999.  pg. 49. 
15
 Ibid.  
16
Arendt, On Revolution, pg. 36 
17
 Ibid. pg. 60. 
18
 Ibid. pg. 61. 
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fundamental to the task of politics.  The right to worship in a particular way is not one 
that a political ruler should have a right to decide.  The preclusion of a particular form of 
worship is an example of “tyrannical encroachment” because such rights are tangential to 
the protection of lives and property.  Moreover, such an encroachment directly inhibits 
the “liberties” referred to in Locke’s formulation.  This is antithetical to Locke’s 
conception of the purpose of government and therefore is a catalyst for revolution.  Thus 
revolutions which occur, like the Glorious Revolution, against politically unnecessary 
impositions and result in the institution of fair political systems are to be understood as 
manifestations of political rebellion.   
 Other legitimate applications of this theory can be detected.  In East Europe, 
during the closing decades of the twentieth century, it became the responsibility of men 
to rebel against the order of things for something that had become vitiated under the soul-
less existence of totalitarian life.  Hence Václav Havel developed his politics of 
responsibility, became a leading figure of the Velvet Revolution and the first president of 
a free and democratized Czechoslovak Republic.  It is an interesting phenomenon that a 
playwright and essayist found the means by which to both rebel and inspire from his 
powerless station in life.  How he did so is a focal point of this essay; illustrating that the 
rise to power of an open and effective political system, simply upon the opening of a 
society to freedom, indeed implies that the truth reconcilable with such an experience is 
in fact true.   
 Political rebellions occur as responsive movements to the political manifestation 
of metaphysical rebellion.  Metaphysical rebellion is a revolt against the order of things 
as ordained by God.  Camus has defined metaphysical rebellion as “the movement by 
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which man protests against his condition and against the whole of creation.”
19
  In 
contradiction to political rebellion, metaphysical rebellion does not stake its grievance 
against the legitimacy of a political regime, but against the nature of man’s existence as 
man.  It can be juxtaposed to political rebellion, which might be understood as the 
rebellion against the nature of man’s existence as citizen.  Camus writes: “The slave 
protests against the condition in which he finds himself within his state of slavery; the 
metaphysical rebel protests against the condition in which he finds himself as a man.”
20
   
The nature of metaphysical rebellion poses a problem which Camus has 
studiously detected.  Like the political rebellion of a slave, metaphysical rebellions are 
characterized by the questioning of a power. The rebel understands himself to be in 
submission to this power, and is motivated to change his condition.
21
  Camus, however, 
understands this grievance to be misplaced in the metaphysical rebel’s case.  His worries 
concerning the consequences of this misplacement are well founded:  
“[The metaphysical rebel] involves this superior being [called God] in the same 
humiliating adventure as mankind’s, its ineffectual power being the equivalent of our 
ineffectual condition.  He subjects it to our power of refusal, bends it to the unbending 
part of human nature, forcibly integrates it into an existence that we render absurd, and 
finally drags it from its refuge outside time and involves it in history, very far from the 
eternal stability that it can find only in the unanimous submission of all men. . . . When 
the throne of God is overturned, the rebel realizes that it is his own responsibility to 
create the justice, order, and unity that he sought in vain within his own condition, and in 
this way to justify the fall of God.  Then begins the desperate effort to create, at the price 
of crime and murder if necessary, the dominion of man. This will not come about without 
terrible consequences, of which we are so far only aware of a few.  But these 
consequences are in no way due to rebellion itself, or at least they only occur to the extent 
that the rebel forgets his original purpose, tires of the tremendous tension created by 
refusing to give a positive or negative answer, and finally abandons himself to complete 
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 Camus, The Rebel, pg. 23 
20
 Ibid, pg. 23 
21
 Ibid. pg. 24 
22
 Ibid. pg. 24-25 
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Through this effort to create, metaphysical rebellion can manifest as a political 
phenomenon in the form of revolution.  As Camus’ statement reveals, moreover, the 
consequences of this form of rebellion are “terrible.”  Political rebellion, however, is also 
a political phenomenon and it opposes metaphysical rebellion in that it is remedial.  The 
similarity of metaphysical rebellion to political rebellion can therefore lead into 
complications.  Hence the central task of this essay is to distinguish political and 
metaphysical rebellions from one another.  The differences between the pragmatic 
implications of each form justify the attempt; often movements that appear to be political 
rebellions and are undertaken energetically, sometimes with the best of intentions, are 
actually metaphysical rebellions whose consequence is political discord and experiential 
horror.  The French Revolution provides an example of an apparently political appeal that 
was infact grounded in metaphysical rebellion and whose consequence was therefore 
disorder. 
The French Revolution was driven by a sense of compassion for the poor and 
miserable.  Hannah Arendt, in her book On Revolution, recalls Rousseau’s observation 
that “an ‘innate repugnance at seeing a fellow creature suffer’ had become common in 
certain strata of European society and precisely among those who made the French 
Revolution.”
23
  Hence, the Declaration of the Rights of man represented much more than 
the preservation of the condition of each individual’s stake in society, but sought an 
egalitarianism of condition itself.  It not being the king but God who had allocated 
different stations and portions to the different social classes, the proposition did not 
represent a political appeal, but a metaphysical one.  Arendt writes: 
                                                
23
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 13
 “the men of the Revolution were no longer concerned with the emancipation of citizens, 
or with equality in the sense that everybody should be equally entitled to his legal 
personality. . . . They believed they had emancipated nature herself, as it were, liberated 
the natural man in all men, and given him the Rights of Man to which each was entitled, 




 Attempting to fit such a supposition into the Lockean social contract is not a 
straightforward assignment.  It is not within the prerogative of any king or executive to 
suppress what was appearing to emerge as a ‘new’ natural right.  Some right that had 
heretofore been suppressed in mankind across history, such as the universal assuagement 
of suffering, is not a justifiable grievance against which a governing power may feasibly 
be held responsible because it is a plea which may be heard with compassion but not one 
that can reasonably be addressed.  The existence of suffering in the world has always 
transcended political culpability.   
Consequently irrationality became the design of the revolutionaries, the guillotine 
their method.  The assertion of the new law which sought to transfigure reality rested on 
the annihilation of that portion of society which interrupted the designs of the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man.  Simply because they existed and claimed what was theirs, the 
French elites preempted the foundation of an equality of condition in France.  The 
solution became the eradication of that class of men.  Mass murder of compatriots, 
however, represents a tremendous moral compromise for an impracticable utopia.  The 
act was a metaphysical rebellion, and the moral compromise resulted in experiential 
terror.  When the persecution of the ancien regime proved no panacea, the guillotines 
were turned in upon the revolutionaries themselves; Robespierre did not escape his ideas.  
The impracticability and consequences of metaphysical rebellion will receive persistent 
                                                
24
 Ibid. pg. 104 
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attention in this analysis.  Such is an attempt to illustrate the duplicity of metaphysical 
rebellion; it is an enticing proposition – but it does not work.  
 The French experience is only one example of metaphysical rebellion.  The 
socialist systems designed by European intellectuals in the nineteenth century, 
enlightened and eager to renounce God, swept Russian intellectuals like wild-fire; the 
Marxian roots of Leninist-Stalinist Russia also exemplify metaphysical rebellion.  Such 
movements represent the work of nihilists who do not accept the world as it is in its most 
fundamental precepts and who would seek to rebuild in its stead a dream-world at any 
cost.  In prophetic fashion Fyodor Dostoevsky broke from socialist ideas and began 
developing literary characters that foresaw with precision the fate of his country.  The 
most brilliantly developed of his characters are rebels, God is their grievance.  His art is 
the exposition of the mendacity of metaphysical rebellion.   
 From the two counter points of Dostoevsky’s metaphysical rebels and the political 
rebellion of Havel, I will hope to elucidate my claim that there are, simply, two types of 
rebels, representing the antipodes of man’s experience as man.  I additionally seek to 
illustrate that the two phenomena can be linked into one single progression.  The act of 
metaphysical rebellion implies a fixation with mundane affairs, when this fixation affects 
societies and the regimes which govern them, it becomes inherently necessary for 
political rebellion to find a manner of living more conducive to happiness.  Yet rebellions 
do not happen magically or combust from thin air.  In order for the metaphysical 
rebellion to catalyze a political rebellion, much is reliant upon the psychological 
disposition of the affected society.  As stated, all rebels proclaim the truth and believe 
that they are taking the ‘right’ action.  Hence, how is this happiness formulated and how 
 15
can man realize the erroneousness of wrong action; essentially, how does man understand 
when he is actually right, and when he has been wrong?   
 A frame-work for analyzing the process of rebellion, and for answering these 
questions, has been developed by Eric Voegelin and will be employed herein for the 
purpose of dividing the phenomenon of rebellion into the categories of metaphysical 
rebellion and political rebellion.  In order to develop this framework from various aspects 
of Voegelin’s thought, it is necessary to focus upon two primary areas: his theory of 
consciousness and his theory of modern gnosticism.  These two theories reveal the 
psychological traits inherent to the political and metaphysical rebel respectively.  Before 
developing these theories, I would like to discuss the classical foundations to them.   
I 
 Apperception of truth can be derived in Voegelin from the classical experience.  
Indeed that experience can lend, in the example of Socrates, credence to the truth of 
being a humble creature in an already crafted world.  A central part of the Socratic story 
is his trial and death, in which the fundaments of rebellion are evident.  He simply had to 
acquiesce in submission to the Athenian order, but rather chose to rebel: “let me go free 
or do not let me go free; but I will never do anything else, even if I am to die many 
deaths.”
25
  He was convicted and his sentence was death.  His friends offered to save him.  
Again all that was necessary was his submission but he refused to abandon the “difficult 
thing:” “Neither in court nor in war ought I or anyone else to do anything and everything 
to contrive an escape from death . . . the difficult thing is not to escape death, I think, but 
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 Plato. Trans. By Rouse, W.H.D., ed. By Warmington, Eric H. and Rouse, Phillip G., Great Dialogues of 




  Socrates’ unwavering awareness of the nature of wickedness 
illustrates the fundamental characteristics of the quintessential political rebel. 
Socrates’ wisdom justified the willingness to choose death over wickedness; the 
character of it points towards its inspiration as amongst the eternal things.  As Plato tells 
it, the Oracle at Delphi inspired Socrates to discover the character of his wisdom.  He 
compared himself to another man, supposedly wise, and found: “the fact is that neither of 
us knows anything beautiful and good, but he thinks he does know when he doesn’t, and I 
don’t know and don’t think I do: so I am wiser than he is by only this trifle, that what I do 
not know I don’t think I do.”
27
  Socrates’ choice of death was validated by the fact that 
his rebellion was in accordance with the truth of the eternal things: “the truth really is, 
gentleman, that the god is in fact wise, and in this oracle he means that human wisdom is 
worth little or nothing. . . .”
28
  Therefore the indictment against Socrates, which reads: 
“Socrates is a criminal, who corrupts the young and does not believe in the gods whom 
the state believes in, but other new spiritual things instead,” disavows the truth revealed 
to Socrates by the Oracle.
29
  The truth of eternal matters is unknowable to political 
authorities and man generally.  Men can not possibly have prescribed laws regarding the 
gods accurately, as their wisdom regarding eternal matters is essentially “worth little or 
nothing.” The rebellion of Socrates is therefore an example of political rebellion; it is the 
unwillingness to abandon one’s attunement to the eternal foundations of the truth  in 
spite of mundane circumstances  which characterizes this special form of rebel. 
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 Voegelin’s conceptions of transcendence and reason underlay his theory of 
consciousness and rely on the concept of the good as eternal.  Voegelin develops his 
understanding of the classical conception of the good in the third volume of Order and 
History: Plato and Aristotle.  Particularly relevant to this analysis are his remarks on 
Plato’s Republic.   
Therein, Plato develops an illustration of truth residing beyond the realm of 
material existence. The sun, or the idea of the Agathon, is an analogy for the highest good: 
“the sun not only provides what is seen with the power of being seen, but also with 
generation, growth, and nourishment although it itself isn’t generation.”
30
  The good is 
noticeably not an object of cognition but something more: “the condition which 
characterizes the good must receive still greater honor.”
31
  It is clearly spelled out as 
something which transcends being: “the good isn’t being but is still beyond being, 
exceeding it in dignity and power.”
32
  However, the realization of the idea of the good is 
not given in man’s experience; rather it must be detected through an often laborious 
process.  As Socrates was insistent on the “difficult thing” in the Apology, he insists on a 
“longer and harder way” in the Republic.
33




 The Allegory is effective on many levels, but most importantly is its effectiveness 
in exposing the bifurcated nature of existence.  The representative antipodal truths of the 
sunlight and of the cave characterize the eternal truth of the political rebel and the 
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worldly truth of the metaphysical rebel.  In Plato’s Allegory, life in the cave is juxtaposed 
by life in the sunlight.  Cave dwellers are understood to be prisoners, their understanding 
of truth commensurable with “the shadows of artificial things.”
35
  The cave is somehow 
understood by its dwellers, despite the strange and unnatural conception of life depicted 
therein, to be a congenial place.  Lethargy seems to them tranquility.  This condition is 
apparently a source of fixation for the cave dwellers, as affirmed by the response of one 
who attempts to climb from the depths.  “In pain” and “dazzled” the man finds himself 
“at a loss,” acquiescing under the conviction “that what was seen before is truer than 
what is now shown.”
36
  He abandons his revolt for the ease of the cave.  Indeed, it is even 
dangerous to attempt such a revolt.  If a man were to rise, and return:  
“and if he once more had to compete with those perpetual prisoners in forming judgments 
about those shadows while his vision was dim, before his eyes had recovered, and if the 
time needed for getting accustomed were not at all short, wouldn’t he be the source of 
laughter, and wouldn’t it be said of him that he went up and came back with his eyes 
corrupted, and that it’s not even worth trying to go up? And if they were somehow able to 





The cave is perpetuated not only because it appears to be the easiest way to live, but 
because there is a threat involved in escaping from the condition of life within it.  This is 
a trait of regimes and societies affected by metaphysical rebellion.  It is detectable in the 
Socratic example, and it raises a question: If this “difficult truth” were so impracticable, 
why was it not eradicated from being long ago? 
In fact, man does know of a truth beyond the cave.  Voegelin refers to the 
discovery of this truth as “epochal,” and he lauds the significance of it: “When the soul 
opened toward transcendent reality, it found a source of order superior in rank to the 
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established order of society as well as a truth in critical opposition to the truth at which 
society had arrived through the symbolism of its self-interpretation.”
38
  While the 
discovery may account for no constitutive change to reality itself, it does result in a 
“complication” which produces antagonisms between conceptions of reality: “Both types 
of truth will from now on exist together; and the tension between the two, in various 
degrees of consciousness, will be a permanent structure of reality.”
39
  The division of 
political and metaphysical rebellion rests upon the conception of truth to which man has 
attuned himself; the truth of “transcendent reality” is the standard by which political 
rebellions are judged.     
 These reflections on Platonic thought inspire two considerations, both 
manageably handled with respective theories of Voegelin’s.  The first concerns the 
danger inherent in the “complication,” we will return to it shortly.  The other 
consideration relates to the nature of the truth discovered in the classical experience.  
How is such a thing as truth beyond immanent reality discerned by men?  This answer is 
derived from Voegelin’s theory of consciousness.   
II 
 Voegelin’s theory of consciousness, drawing from the classical conception of not 
only Platonic philosophy but also from Aristotelian methodology, provides a measure by 
which the truth that inspires a political rebellion can be detected.  The first point to be 
considered concerning such a proposition is that it is based in empirical observation and 
not in speculative abstraction.  Consequently, as Voegelin writes in Anamnesis: “the form 
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it will assume in the individual case will depend on the circumstances.”
40
  This is one of 
the major reasons why a tidy definition of truth is so difficult to articulate.  Truth can be 
identified less with a specific definition of what it is than with an experience revealed to 
man through his very participation in reality.  Voegelin asserts that the recognition of 
truth is the result of the individual attempt to orient one’s understanding of existence 
towards that which is actually real, not simply that which has been proclaimed or 
postulated to be real.  For example, Aristotle does not defend the Nicomachean Ethics 
with an arrogant claim to knowledge or with a pedantic display, but with the qualification 
that “we must examine the conclusions we have reached so far by applying them to the 
actual facts of life: if they are in harmony with the facts we must accept them, and if they 
clash we must assume that they are mere words.”
41
  Consequently, Aristotle was open to 
the truth wherever it led him.  Proclamations of truth were not to be confused with the 
real thing, founded in the observation of reality.  Likewise, the Voegelinian conception 
on how man arrives at truth, or perceives the order of being as ordained by God to be the 
order of being as ordained by God, is not self-evident but dependent on consciousness of 
the fullness of reality, and on a “desire to know” the tenets of being within that reality.  
He writes in Anamnesis: 
“The quality of this instrument, then, and consequently the quality of the results, will 
depend on the analyst’s willingness to reach out into all the dimensions of the reality in 
which his conscious existence is an event, it will depend on his desire to know.  A 
consciousness of this kind is not an a priori structure, nor does it just happen, nor is its 
horizon a given.  It rather is a ceaseless action of expanding, ordering, articulating, and 
correcting itself; it is an event in the reality of which as a part it partakes.  It is a 
permanent effort at responsive openness to the appeal of reality, at bewaring of premature 
satisfaction, and above all at avoiding the self-destructive phantasy [sic] of believing the 
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reality of which it is a part to be an object external to itself that can be mastered by 




Consciousness is then consistent with the Aristotelian conception of objectivity.  Because 
it is discovered through a process of awareness and discovery of the whole realm of 
man’s being, it signifies a concordance with “the actual facts of life.”  That which is 
sought to be known, but cannot be understood in terms of physical materialism, is that 
which Plato has symbolized in the idea of the Agathon; it is truth beyond physical and 
material being, but a truth ineradicable once discovered.  As it defies articulation but is 
the unmovable source of orientation, Voegelin calls this object the “transcendent 
ground.”
43
   
 The Platonic formulation of the Agathon and the Voegelinian interpretation of it 
are not unique conceptualizations of the ground of being.  Various expressions of similar 
ideas suggest the validity of this ground, despite its ineffability.  Leibniz, in 1714 posed it 
as the Question: “Why is there something, why not nothing? And why do things have to 
be as they are and not different?”  In Leibniz’s words: “This ultimate reason of things is 
called God.”
44
  In many ways, asking the Question posed by Leibniz leads one to an 
understanding of its answer.  Thus by “desiring to know,” or asking the Question, man 
discovers that there is an answer for it.  Although embodied in many expressions, there is 
but one consistent Answer.  According to Sandoz: 
“In its various modes, [the Question] structures the process of the search of the Ground of 
being; and its very asking implies an Answer just as answers given imply the Question, 
even if the responsive answer of men out of the several experiential horizons of myth, 
philosophy, revelation, and the meditative styles of India and China provide in their 
                                                
42
 Voegelin, Anamnesis, pg. 4 
43
 Voegelin, Eric, ed. By Sandoz, Ellis.  The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 11, “In Search of the 
Ground.”  University of Missouri Press, Columiba and London: 2000. pg. 232 
44
 Sandoz Ellis, The Voegelinian Revolution.  Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick: 2000. pg. 196; see 
also Voegelin, The Collected Works, vol. 11, pg. 225 
 22
equivalence no more than representative truth.  It is through the differentiation of the 
Question that compact truth dissolves to differentiate as the advance of truth in history.  
History is thus understood to be the dimension of reality in the In-Between in which the 
luminosity of the meaning of the Whole increases and in which the process of the Whole 




 As Sandoz identifies, the Answer can lead into a conflicting situation in which 
man must attempt to subscribe to the divine ground as he lives within the confines of 
immanent reality.  And as Voegelin argues, the discovery of the transcendent ground 
does not transfigure the nature of existence itself: “the leap upward in being is not a leap 
out of existence.”
46
  It rather forces men to engage in this In-Between, and to allow 
themselves to be drawn towards a different ordering impetus than that which is seemingly 
immediately self-evident.  The tenets of being have not been altered by the leap, merely 
man’s conception of those tenets, but: 
“something has changed . . . in the order of being and existence itself.  Existence is 
partnership in the community of being; and the discovery of imperfect participation, of a 
mismanagement of existence through lack of proper attunement to the order of being, of 
the danger of a fall from being, is a horror indeed, compelling a radical reorientation of 
existence.”
47
   
 
The discovery of consciousness opens men’s understandings of existence up to more than 
the organic and biological necessities which reflection on the mundane world will 
provide.  Heretofore man must not only provide for those needs, but for the soul as well.  
By opening up the transcendent ground to experience, men discover a completely new 
realm of their being.  Happiness and well-being become reoriented in the process, as 
man’s interests now include an entirely different set of criteria which must be imposed 
upon his worldly needs.  Thus something has indeed changed with the conscious 
discovery of the transcendent ground, at least epistemologically.  This change will affect 
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the way in which thought and action alike are oriented; it will affect, for example, the in 
which things such as ‘reason’ are conceived.   
 According to Voegelin, the divine ground as the object of consciousness is the 
proper understanding of reason.  This conception falls in opposition to the conception of 
reason as a tool for calculating mundane fulfillment.  The two forms of reason are 
respectively representative of the two types of truth available to human insight.  Reason 
in the Voegelinian conception can be defined as “a word denoting the tension between 
man as a human being and the divine Ground of his existence of which he is in search.”  
Indeed, “The consciousness of being caused by the divine Ground and being in search of 
the divine Ground – that is reason.  Period.  That is the meaning of the word reason.”
48
  
For this sort of reason Voegelin adopted the term Nous, coined classically by Parmenides 
for “man’s faculty of ascending to the vision of being,” to avoid terminological confusion 
regarding a word that can also be used to describe the logic by which Plato’s cave is 
maintained.
49
   
 So-called reason in discordance with the transcendent ground is fallacy, but this 
does not mean that fallacy cannot be postulated.  Camus reminds: “the world after all can 
realize itself in crime and in pursuit of a false concept.”
50
  Voegelin, too, makes the 
assertion that our understanding of what the ground is, “might be unfounded,” thus it is 
the persistent questing for the ground or of attuning oneself to it, for reason (nous), and 
not its actual attainment, which is of prime significance.  Voegelin writes: 
“An insight concerning being must always really be present – not only so that the first 
steps of the analysis can be taken, but so that the very idea of the analysis can be 
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conceived and developed at all.  And indeed, Platonic-Aristotelian analysis did not in the 
least begin with speculations about its own possibility, but with the actual insight into 
being which motivated the analytical process.  The decisive event in the establishment of 
a politike episteme was the specifically philosophical realization that the levels of being 





 This paradigm reveals two fundamental insights concerning the nature of 
consciousness.  On the one hand, it serves to improve life by making men happy within 
the world as it may exist.  The pursuer of this reason understands such an attunement to 
facilitate a more fulfilling manner of living.  At the same time, it is not a speculative 
attempt at improvement.  Consciousness attempts to improve life by changing the way 
men understand it, through the activity of questioning the nature of the world in which we 
live and accepting openly the results of that inquiry.  It is notably an active process.  
Voegelin has described it as both a “critical consciousness” and a “cognitive 
consciousness.”
52
  The theme of “desiring to know” is forefront: 
“The questioning unrest carries the assuaging answer within itself in as much as man is 
moved to his search of the ground by the divine ground of which he is in search.  The 
ground is not a spatially distant thing but a divine presence that becomes manifest in the 




Thus changes fashioned to the world through this process are brought about by attempts 
to correlate the world with the experience of consciousness, and changes can be measured 
by this standard.  It is not speculative because a consciousness of the transcendent ground 
must condone the modifications to reality.  Changes are a priori grounded in reality, as 
revealed through consciousness, before such changes even occur.  It is not concerned 
with whether or not a change is physically possible, but with whether or not such a 
change can be condoned in the souls of men.  We see then that men who undertake 
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change based upon this inclination are concerned with the fulfillment of man as he exists, 
which is achieved through caring for the soul, and through disclosing the dictates of the 
soul to reality.  This is the groundwork of the psychological disposition of the political 
rebel.  He does not wish to create a better man who may in turn create a better world; he 
is not frustrated with himself as a man.  He wishes to create a political order in which 
man may be what he is; he is frustrated with politics and with society  with usurpations 
of his human-ness.  He seeks to fulfill his nature as a man, as that nature is dictated to 
him by his conscience and consciousness. 
Conversely, metaphysical rebellion occurs in the man who fails to become 
involved in this process.  It is characterized by first, a person who develops a formula for 
immanent salvation and, second, the masses which accept these formulas as doctrine and 
attempt to enact them.  The former represents, in Voegelin’s words:  “. . . persons who 
know that, and why, their opinions cannot stand up under critical analysis and who 
therefore make the prohibition of the examination of their premises part of their 
dogma.”
54
  This phenomenon directly opposes the spiritual act of seeking truth; it is “the 
prohibition of questioning.”
55
  By prohibiting and refusing to ask questions it is possible 
to close the faculty of man’s being which is receptive to the transcendent ground of being.  
Thus, it is possible to quell the “desire to know” and to prohibit the Question.  The 
consequence is that dogmas become proliferated into mass movements through the 
acceptance of them without questioning, by the standard of consciousness, the premises 
on which they were constructed.  In accordance with Voegelin’s theory of consciousness, 
however, is the notion that the imposition of such realities upon societies through the 
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implementation of political systems is not a phenomenon against which humans have no 
defense.  The problem is solved through an individual awareness of consciousness, and 
therefore is one that “everyone possesses the means of overcoming . . . in his own life.”
56
 
In this sense the mode of analysis evident in Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, informed 
by noetic reason, becomes a form of “therapeutic analysis.”
57
   
Essentially, attunement to the divine ground is facilitated through the asking of 
the Question.  When the Question is prohibited, a political rebel is one who asks it.  
Hence, political rebellion can be understood as serving a sort of spiritual therapy.  
Therapy, however, implies regeneration.  Therefore, we must first better understand the 
process of spiritual corruption.  Voegelin’s theory of modern gnosticism provides a way 
of describing this process. 
III 
 The corruption is a conscious annihilation of the transcendent ground of truth, 
manifesting in the actions characteristic of metaphysical rebellion.  The typical political 
manifestation of metaphysical rebellion is a society that does not uniformly understand 
their social state as a rebellion against God.  The act of concealing reality as ordained by 
God from a society is the aspect of metaphysical rebellion which results in horrific 
political consequences; essentially, metaphysical rebellion often appears politically as 
totalitarianism.  As Voegelin frames it: “the limit is reached when an activist sect which 
represents the Gnostic truth organizes civilization into an empire under its rule.  
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 Voegelin’s theory of gnosticism provides a scheme for identifying the various 
examples of metaphysical rebellion and its political counterpart  totalitarianism.   
Modern gnosticism is a system through which the suppression of the Question can be 
facilitated, thereby attuning gnostic thinkers to an immanently oriented conception of 
truth that is uninformed by noetic insight.  The political consequence is a totalitarian 
regime driven by ideological chauvinism, while the individual consequence is a loss of 
the authenticity attained through consciousness of the whole range of human nature, and 
specifically to the transcendent ground.  Because this loss is precisely that which 
facilitates the political and personal conditions that characterize metaphysical rebellion, 
modern gnosticism will be useful as an analytical tool in this essay, employed as a means 
of identifying and explaining the process inherent to metaphysical rebellion.   
The history of gnosticism is complex and its manifestation in reality is manifold.  
There are, however, six fundamental characteristics that apply to the process of 
metaphysical rebellion: 
1) “The Gnostic is dissatisfied with his situation” 
2) “The belief that the drawbacks of the situation can be attributed to the fact that the 
world is intrinsically poorly organized” 
3) “The belief that salvation from the evil of the world is possible” 
4) “The belief that the order of being will have to be changed in an historical process” 
5)” In the narrower sense – the belief that a change in the order of being lies in the realm 
of human action, that this salvational act is possible through man’s own effort” 
6) “The construction of a formula for self and world salvation, as well as the gnostic’s 
readiness to come forward about the salvation of mankind”
59
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Dissatisfaction with situation is the motivating factor from which the action of the 
gnostic/metaphysical rebel springs; we will return to the attributes and implications of 
this characteristic.  It is a sweeping characteristic that will also be applicable to the 
motivations of the political rebel; for now let us dwell on those characteristics which help 
us to distinguish metaphysical rebellion from political rebellion.   
The attempt to reconcile the metaphysical rebel’s motivation is dependant upon 
the maintenance of a system to replace the configuration of the world as ordained by God 
and revealed to man via reason (nous); Voegelin writes: “Gnosis desires dominion over 
being; in order to seize control of being the gnostic constructs his system.  The building 
of systems is a gnostic form of reasoning, not a philosophical one.”
60
  Philosophy and 
science become vitiated if employed for the purpose of reconfiguring reality into a 
system; the plight becomes to recreate rather than to observe human nature.  Camus’ 
observation, quoted earlier, affirms the notion: “When the throne of God is overturned, 
the rebel realizes that it is his own responsibility to create the justice, order, and unity that 
he sought. . . .”  In the attempt to reconstruct reality in a new and speculative manner the 
gnostic has overstepped the bounds of philosophy.  Philosophy is the love of wisdom; the 
philosopher, as was Aristotle, is led in the direction that the evidence leads him.  In the 
attempt to reconfigure the fundamental nature of man’s experience into a “system,” 
however, the observational role of science is overstepped; in Camus’ words: “Real 
objectivity would consist in judging by those results which can be scientifically observed 
and by facts and their general tendencies. . . . An interminable subjectivity which is 
imposed on others as objectivity: . . . that is the philosophical definition of terror.”
61
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Crossing the threshold from observation into creation constitutes metaphysical rebellion; 
it is this action which ends in experiential horror brought about as means of attempting to 
address the grievance professed against God.  The terror imposed is derivative of, and 
perhaps reveals, the impracticability of such systems.  In Eric Voegelin’s words: 
“The constitution of being is what it is, and cannot be affected by human fancies.  Hence, 
the metastatic denial of the order of mundane existence is neither a true proposition in 
philosophy, nor a program of action that could be executed.  The will to transform reality 





The impossibility of transfiguring the order of existence, in short, does not stop men from 
attempting to do so.  The implacable nature of the situation, however, leads gnostic 
thinkers into one particular shared trait: the attempted obfuscation of the given order of 
existence through a gnostic system.  Political systems that are constructed for the purpose 
of this obfuscation are therefore the indicative markings of metaphysical rebellion 
manifested into political action.  Because the motivating factor of all rebellions is 
dissatisfaction with situation, the manifestation of political systems helps to distinguish 
the metaphysical rebel from the political rebel.   
 The example of Karl Marx illustrates how gnostic speculation is reliant upon a 
system for the obfuscation of the given order of things.  From this example we can also 
understand how experiential terror becomes a consequence of the gnostic plight to 
conceal this obfuscation’s disjunction with reality.  Voegelin’s analysis of Marx reveals 
both the fallacy inherent to his logic and the means by which Marx attempts to conceal 
this fallacy so that his system can appear to be valid.  In Marx the fundamental 
characteristics of gnosticism can be detected, as can the means of prohibiting questions 
which allows the system to obtain.  Hence, through an analysis of his system we can see 
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how Marx attempts to place the role of Creator within the human sphere.  Consequently, 
we can see how this misplacement infringes upon the “authentic” experiences of those 
affected by it through its suppression of such authenticity.  The authentic experiences of 
human beings created by God is replaced by the experiences of Marx’s manufactured 
“new men.” 
 Voegelin notes that in Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) 
the following proposition is made: “Nature as it develops in human history . . . as it 
develops through industry . . . is true anthropological nature.”
63
  Voegelin contends that 
the actual nature of man, whatever it is, is not as Marx describes: “Man is not a self-
created, autonomous being carrying the origin and meaning of his existence within 
himself.”
64
  Or more explicitly: “man experiences himself as a being who does not exist 
from himself.  He exists in an already given world.  This world itself exists by reason of a 
mystery, and the name for the mystery, for the cause of this being of the world, of which 
man is a component, is referred to as ‘God.’”
65
   
 Opposing claims to truth made on the abstract level of ‘man exists of himself’ 
juxtaposed by ‘man exists of a superior but mysterious reality’ can be deciphered through 
a scientific analysis of, as Aristotle put it, “the actual facts of life.”  Voegelin, consistent 
with Aristotelian methodology, grounds his critique on empirical evidence and is able to 
expose that Marx’s claim lacks the backing of facts accordant to real life: “to . . . 
questions prompted by the ‘tangible’ experience that man does not exist of himself, Marx 
chooses to reply that they are a ‘product of abstraction. . . .’ Nature and man are real only 
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as Marx construes them in his speculation.”
66
  Because Marx’s speculation is itself 
abstraction, he can do nothing more than accuse those who consciously perceive a 
different truth of themselves abstracting.  He has no positive proof of his claims, however, 
as they have yet to unfold in historical reality.  For this reason, Marx’s formula for “the 
salvation of mankind” is “neither a true proposition in philosophy, nor a program of 
action that could be executed.”  The consequence of his system is terror because it is only 
facilitated through the suppression of any individual’s authenticity that might run 
contrary to Marx’s speculation. 
 In this game, the lie accusing the truth of being the lie is an unexceptional 
characteristic of systematization.
67
  Because Marx lacks the “tangible experience” which 
prompts questioners of his system, he must therefore declare: “Do not think, do not 
question me.”
68
  This act is what Voegelin has called “the prohibition of questions,” and 
constitutes a blatant denial of the Question.  The system has proven itself logically flawed; 
its designer understands the question against which his system can be disproved.  Instead 
of abandoning the system, however, the thinker attempts to abandon the question 
(Question) which made him aware of his fallacy.  Voegelin does not refrain from labeling 
Karl Marx an “intellectual swindler.”
69
   
 When such a swindle is enacted politically the constitution of being is negated in 
tangible experience, not in thought. What is real can therefore only be what the system, 
embodied as political authority, declares to be real.  Yet “the constitution of being is what 
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it is,” and therefore the system is the attempted construction of a reality which operates in 
active conflict against the order of being revealed to man through an attunement to the 
transcendent ground.  The institution of systems, because of this conflict, results in 
regimes whose power is maintained through a serious of prohibitions.  Evidence of these 
prohibitions lie in certain now familiar devices, all implemented to attenuate this conflict 
between system and reality: namely guillotines, gas-showers, and the GULAG.  The 
political consequence of metaphysical rebellion, therefore, is the institution of a 
totalitarian regime whose existence necessitates control over and manipulation of all 
aspects of existence.  Such a regime takes hold of a civilization when the propositions of 
a gnostic thinker are adopted en masse.  The existence of totalitarianism in the world is, 
however, dependent upon individual and societal acceptances of it.  An understanding of 
the political ramifications of gnostic speculation relies upon the relationship between a 
gnostic thinker and his society, with a focus on the promises made by the gnostic thinker. 
Speculative claims which facilitate the proliferation of a system are responsible 
for the “intellectual swindle.”  They are promises made by the thinker to justify the 
system and revolve around the improvement of man’s experience as man.  These 
promises are typically consistent with the gnostic goal of “salvation from the evil of the 
world.”  However, such promises are not constructed on empirical observation.  They are 
unverifiable because the systemist has no evidence to support the claims made of the 
system.  These promises, by appealing to the desire for mundane satiety, can have the 
effect of stirring ideological radicalism grounded in the speculative promise of an 
immanent heaven on earth.  Consequently, the acceptance of speculative promises lulls 
 33
societies into metaphysical rebellion through the guise of political change that is believed 
to be practicable. 
 Voegelin distinguishes between the gnostic thinker and the society affected by 
him, although characteristics of metaphysical rebellion can be detected in both groups.  
Those truly deceived by the propositions of a metaphysical rebel include ideologues who 
do not know that they are ideologues.
70
  They follow along with the cause because its 
promises are appealing, and they utterly believe those promises to be forthcoming.  
Additionally, there is the party responsible for the deception of the rabble.
71
   The 
deception induces the ideologues to adopt the cause of the metaphysical rebellion by 
proclaiming the goals of the rebellion to be in accord with reality as ordained by God.
72
  
Thus the party responsible for the deception cozens an ideological rabble for support.  
This rabble, with mixed motivations from fear to passion, will then condone crimes 
committed for the sake of the ideology.  Although the promise offered is a deception, it is 
taken to be real from the standpoint of the ideologues as a consequence of something 
Voegelin refers to as “compact honesty,” the honest and well-meaning belief in the 
proposition that the deceiver promises.
73
  In effect, the deceived group believes that they 
are undertaking a legitimate political rebellion that will result in the creation of a more 
perfect political order.  This belief allows the deceiver to undertake the radical means 
necessary to perpetrate his deception.  Specifically, belief in the political promises of the 
deceiver allows the ideologues to be carried to the point of condoning those promises by 
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any means, including criminal ones.  The acceptance of criminal behavior implicitly 
connects the ideological rabble to the gnostic thinker, implicating all of society in 
metaphysical rebellion.  This acceptance grounds the movement in the quest for 
dominion over the organization of the material world, and lays the foundation for a 
totalitarian regime to take hold of a society by convincing that society that such a 
dominion would be experienced as utopian.  
The promise of a forthcoming utopia has been referred to as the creation of a 
“second reality.”  The term, derived from two twentieth century Austrian novelists  
Robert Musil and Heimito von Doderer  is meant to apply to one who indulges in a 
dream-world construction with the understanding that such a construction is an actual 
political possibility.
74
  The creation of them implies the gnostic motivation  
dissatisfaction with situation.  The utopian nature of these constructions, however, aids in 
distinguishing the metaphysical rebel’s dissatisfaction from the political rebel’s 
dissatisfaction      
Second realities are developed around the idea that the world, as given to us by 
God, is simply not good enough.  The idea of heaven is equated to something practicable 
on earth; as Voegelin has put it: “the construction of a second reality comes from a desire 
to have a beyond in this life.”
75
  Barry Cooper has noted the idea that “the impossibility 
or untenability” of one’s situation inspires one to honestly believe that the constitution of 
being as ordained by God can be transfigured.
76
  This idea is often inspired by the 
condition of man’s existence in the world.  Men are not all kings, and many lives are 
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lived in depravity.  Thus the depraved find themselves particularly attracted to the 
promises of a second reality in which that depravity is promised to transfigure into a 
utopian condition.  It is a dishonest position, however, because the constitution of being 
as ordained by God cannot be changed.  Such an attempt bears consequences not 
proclaimed by the gnostic thinker.  Cooper argues: “Revolutionaries and others who 
indulge in the practice do so for a very specific purpose: to screen the ‘first reality’ of 
common experience from view or to put the common experience of reality into 
shadow . . . this second act does not abolish the frictions in response to which it was 
initially undertaken, but rather enhances them ‘into a general conflict between the world 
of his imagination and the real world.’”
77
     
This conflict culminates in rebellious action; there is an existing order against 
which such hopes must react. Political rebellions conflict with the nature of the political 
regime which is the cause of the rebel’s grievance.  In the case of metaphysical rebellion, 
however, revolutionaries overlook the stipulations of Locke’s formulation of the social 
contract and are not inspired by the nature of the regime that their political action 
displaces.  Depravity is only an excuse for political violence if there is a political actor 
that can be charged as responsible for the depraved condition.  In essence, the condition 
of the metaphysical rebel often becomes an alibi for the crimes his rebellion motivates 
him to commit.  And indeed, revolutionary violence directed against a political ruler who 
has done nothing tyrannical to inspire it should be understood as a crime.   
Therefore, the ideologues themselves and not merely the gnostic thinker can be 
identified as undertaking the psychological progression of metaphysical rebellion.  
Although metaphysical rebellion begins as an often innocent derailment from the given 
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order of existence, such as a question concerning the depravity of one’s condition, the 
rebel persists in his derailment in spite of the fact that his convictions become 
acknowledged, as a result of the discovery of the criminality inspired by such convictions, 
to be false.  The consequence of this progression is the revelation of the derailment as 
both fallacious and evil in nature.  As Voegelin formulates it, the process is applicable to 
both the deceiver and the deceived, and progresses from innocent, but wrong, action 
through the realization of the evil nature of such wrong behavior:   
“1) For the surface act it will be convenient to retain the term Nietzsche 
used, ‘deception.’ But in content this action does not necessarily differ 
from a wrong judgment arising from another motive than the gnostic.  It 
could also be an ‘error.’  It becomes a deception only because of the 
psychological context. 
 
2) In the second stage the thinker becomes aware of the untruth of his 
assertion or speculation, but persists in it in spite of this knowledge.  Only 
because of his awareness of the untruth does the action become a 
deception.  And because of the persistence in the communication of what 
are recognized to be false arguments, it also becomes an ‘intellectual 
swindle.’ 
 
3) In the third stage the revolt against God is revealed and recognized to 
be the motive of the swindle.  With the continuation of the intellectual 





As the deceiver performs the “intellectual swindle” with the construction of his system, 
the rabble perpetuates the swindle by continuing to indulge in the second reality even 
after criminal measures are required to complete the construction.  Thus, once criminal 
action is undertaken for the purpose of political achievement the ideological rabble can 
no longer claim innocence as a result of being deceived.  Undertaking criminal action, 
such as political violence perpetrated against innocent people, reveals to any 
conscionable person the mendacity of such action. Therefore, the “demonic mendacity” 
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underscoring metaphysical rebellion is revealed by the willingness of metaphysical rebels 
to condone evil atrocities.  For them, the action and the goal of the action supersede the 
moral implications of such behavior.  
         Voegelin’s appeal that “there is no right to be stupid” is simply the assertion of 
each man’s responsibility for attuning himself to the moral ends which inform man of 
such concepts as criminality.
79
  By stupidity Voegelin means “that a man, because of 
his loss of reality, is not in a position to rightly orient his action in the world.”
80
  To 
further identify stupidity with immoral behavior, Voegelin coins the term “spiritual 
illiteracy,” which is “caused by the loss of contact with determinate sectors of reality . . . 
giving rise to stupidity in thinking and in action.”
81
  The sector of reality from which 
the spiritually illiterate man’s faculty has departed is that sector informed by reason 
(nous) and “the desire to know.”  At the level of human conscience, therefore, the 
murder of innocents for political purposes is a stupid thing to do because it ignores the 
moral implications of that act.  Indeed, most stupid acts result in unfortunate 
consequences for the fool(s) who committed them. A review of the physical and 
spiritual repercussions of indulging in gnostic speculation and metaphysical rebellion 
will consequently conclude this chapter, as the pragmatic implications of metaphysical 
rebellion aid in the division of it from political rebellion.  
          The spiritual consequence of the construction of second reality dream-worlds is 
moral disorientation.  This is what Voegelin implies by the term “spiritual illiteracy.”  
Metaphorical support for this position can be found in Plato’s cave dwellers.  The 
fixation with the shadows, the second reality this represents, prevents the cave dwellers 
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from realizing the truth beyond the cave.  Thus the corrupted movement of the spirit 
can be understood as one of descent into the acceptance of the truth commensurable 
with the shadows of the cave, as Voegelin’s connotation infers: “the gnostic movement 
of the spirit does not lead to the erotic opening of the soul, but rather to the deepest 
reach of persistence in the deception, where revolt against God is revealed to be its 
motive and purpose.”
82
  The experience found at the “deepest reaches” is essentially of 
a soul closed to the Question.  This soul is not conscious of that ground which informs 
moral behavior; he consequently cannot distinguish, even in the most seemingly blatant 
cases, right from wrong action.  Jack F. Matlock Jr., former U.S. ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, has illustrated both the experiential reality and the spiritual consequences 
of such a revolt proliferating into political concretion: 
 “. . . imposition of the adopted ideology on all, and forcible suppression of questioning, 
not only of the ideology itself but of the political decisions made in its name by the rulers; 
development of a quasi-religious cult around the founders and often around the current 
leaders of the political movement.  Dostoevsky would lead us to expect from this an 
eventual spiritual bankruptcy.  And, in fact, evidence is rapidly accumulating that this 
process is far advanced in those societies where totalitarian political movements have 




 The totalitarian experience insinuates dreadful physical experiences for those 
affected by it; as Voegelin contends: “the dedivinizing is always followed by a 
dehumanizing.”
84
  Camus has called what manifests, experientially for human beings, 
“the universe of the concentration camp.”
85
  The concentration camp is the mechanism 
through which the “prohibition of questions” is maintained.  The Question is a formidable 
obstacle for a gnostic system to overcome; eradicating the men that would pose the 
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Question, therefore, becomes the quintessential tool of totalitarian regimes.  Metaphysical 
rebellion, therefore, is “demonic mendacity” because it does not proliferate as it was 
purportedly designed.  The gnostic thinker’s promise to rid the world of suffering 
manifests as a utopia speckled with concentration camps.   
IV 
The rebellion against God, as Voegelin notes, is a potentially universal problem: 
“the temptation to fall from a spiritual height that brings the element of uncertainty into 
final clarity down into the more solid certainty of world-immanent, sensible 
fulfillment . . . seems to be a general human problem.”
86
  Fortunately for man, spiritual 
disease is also one for which everyman possess the remedy; as Plato has put it: “this 
power is in the soul of each.”
87
  The workings of consciousness therefore prove a 
proactive antagonist against the workings of gnosticism; in Voegelin’s words: “No one is 
obliged to take part in the spiritual crises of society; on the contrary, everyone is obliged 
to avoid this folly and live his life in order.  Our presentation of the phenomenon, 
therefore, will at the same time furnish the remedy for it through therapeutic analysis.”
88
   
This analysis of rebellion will consequently materialize as a study of choice and 
deliberation – as an analysis of man’s being in relation to the Question.  When man is 
attuned to the Question, he rebels against tyranny despite threats to his mundane being.  
When man is not, he rebels because of conjectured improvements to his mundane 
circumstance.  Political and metaphysical rebellions can therefore be distinguished based 
upon motivating factors.  Both forms of rebellion are driven by dissatisfaction with 
condition.  The grounding of dissatisfaction, however, varies dependent upon the form of 
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rebellion.  The ground is found either in eternal or in worldly affairs, in an open 
attunement to consciousness or in a closed-minded delving for satiety, and juxtaposes the 
form of rebellion undertaken.  Political rebellions are grounded in an attunement to 
metaphysical affairs  in man’s being conscious of his conscience; metaphysical 
rebellions are grounded in an exclusive attunement to worldly affairs.  The nature of 
rebellion is therefore exposed by the reasoning of the man who chooses ‘no.’ 
The study will be conducted in two sections.  In chapter one an analysis of 
Dostoevsky will highlight the characteristics of metaphysical rebellion.  We will be 
attuned to the dream-worlds created by metaphysical rebels, as well as to the deceptions 
undertaken to attempt to bring the dreams into reality.  Additionally, an eye will be 
turned towards the spiritual and physical consequences of metaphysical rebellion.  In 
chapter two an analysis of political rebellion will be undertaken to illustrate how both 
men and societies can recover from the experience of metaphysical rebellion.  The Czech 
experience as told by Václav Havel will be the setting of this analysis.  The focus of 
chapter two will on be the ways in which men individually reject the tenets of a 
metaphysical rebellion, as well as on the ways that individual rejections can crescendo 
into a politically effective movement.  
 The analysis as whole will show the interrelation between the two phenomena.  It 
will show the temptation of the truth proclaimed from the cave, but also the consequences 
of adhering to it.  Because of these consequences, if metaphysical rebellion has 
proliferated in a society as a derivative of an infective political order, it can make men 
aware of their consciences and inspire political rebellion.  These consequences and the 
response they can inspire argue for and suggest the unchangeable nature of the truth.  
 41
William Faulkner once wrote that “there is only one truth, and it covers all things that 
touch the heart.”
89
  As something of an innate response to metaphysical rebellion, 
political rebellion affirms Faulkner’s observation that that the truth cannot be affected by 
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Chapter One: Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky 
 
Metaphysical rebellion and the consequences thereof are a theme of Dostoevsky’s 
work from Notes from Underground on.  The philosophical arguments to be found in his 
mature work are informed by the author’s life, and in particular, by his own affiliation 
with metaphysical rebellion in his younger days.  Through his experience, Dostoevsky 
came to understand both the spiritual and experiential consequences of indulging in the 
idea that “everything is lawful.”
90
  Consequently this chapter will focus on connecting the 
spiritual process of metaphysical rebellion with the personal and political experiences it 
engenders.  Dostoevsky’s arguments are largely considered prophetic; the question which 
provides the essential premise of his mature works, “which is better, a cheap happiness or 
a lofty suffering?,” tormented the twentieth century.
91
  A further consideration of this 
chapter, therefore, will be the connection of the personal experience of metaphysical 
rebellion with the political experience of totalitarianism, as our debt to Dostoevsky is 
recognizable in the footprints of Hitler and Stalin; it is due to the emphasis placed within 
his question.  Dostoevsky incorporates into his query the qualities of debauchery and 
divinity; he leads his reader to question the value of a “cheap happiness” by persistently 
leading his audience to the end of that philosophy. 
 A common introduction to Dostoevsky comes with his classic, The Brothers 
Karamazov.  One who is struck by the moral integrity of Alyosha is in some ways 
surprised, and in other ways not surprised, to learn that the young hero was born in the 
mind of a man who came up “under the dominance of romantic ‘daydreaming,’ the 
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idealism of Schiller, and the French utopian socialism.”
92
  Such an experience engenders 
the idea that “everything is lawful,” which is characteristic of Alyosha’s brother, Ivan. It 
is from the passion with which Ivan defends his metaphysical rebellion that the reader 
suspects the author himself had experienced the ideal of defending innocents.  But it is 
from both Ivan’s Grand Inquisitor and his ultimate insanity that the reader understands 
Dostoevsky’s rejection of the position for its logical end: the defense of murder and the 
dismissal of justice.   
Consequently one cannot imagine a mature Dostoevsky daydreaming of utopia.  
The experiences of Dostoevsky’s life inform this argument.  His personal encounter with 
socialistic fantasies, his descent into nihilism in their defense and turn from them in 
Siberia are not only essential to an understanding of his famous works, but they also 
provide a quintessential example of the philosophical derailment into and recovery from 
gnosticism.  His life is a testament to his philosophy, and must be understood before his 
work is discussed.      
I 
 The daydreams of the young Dostoevsky fit naturally into the revolutionary 
undercurrents of St. Petersburg in the 1840s.  Mochulsky affirms:  
“the transition from romantic idealism to socialism was perfectly natural.  The young 
writer lived in an atmosphere of mystical expectations, of faith in the immanent approach 
of the golden age and in the complete transfiguration of life. . . .  Socialistic utopianism 
appeared to the generation of the forties as a continuation of Christianity, as the 
attainment of evangelical truth.  It was the translation of the Christian Apocalypse into 
contemporary social terms.”
93
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The attempt to attain evangelical truth in the immanent world, however, foments gnostic 
ideals.  It relies upon “the belief that salvation from the evil of the world is possible” and 
“that this salvational act is possible through man’s own effort.”  The misplacement of 
“evangelical truth” as, in Marxian language, “anthropological truth” forced Dostoevsky 
and other socialists to unwittingly embark upon a course of metaphysical rebellion.   In 
the life of the young Dostoevsky this progression is evident in his involvement with the 
Petrashevsky circle beginning in the spring of 1846, and in his affiliation with the more 
radical Belinsky the next year.  His eventual split with Belinsky provided the foundation 
for the maturation of his philosophy. 
 The Petrashevsky circle was a group that Mochulsky categorizes as “philanthropic 
liberals,” bearing marks of socialists, seeking “to cover the whole of the impoverished 
earth with palaces, fruits, and to adorn it with flowers.”
94
  But the movement had not 
slipped into the materialistic socialism one finds in Belinsky, rather it maintained the 
exalted aims of constructing the golden age on the foundation of universal moral integrity, 
of a mankind dedicated to loving one another.  At a gathering of Petrashevists, 
Konstantin Mochulsky tells us that D. Akhsharumov said: 
“And here were to be found men with an ardent love for all people, for the whole of 
mankind, and likewise, for God, who dedicated their entire lives in an attempt to discover 
an ordering of society wherein all would be rich, happy, and content; where our very life, 




In this discourse, while God is exalted and some degree of integrity is maintained, the 
first signs of bad faith or material predilection emerge; it is hoped that all be rich as well 
as happy.  On another occasion K.I. Timkovsky hoped to “demonstrate in a purely 
scientific fashion the divinity of Jesus Christ, the necessity of his coming into the world 
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for the purpose of salvation, and His birth of a Virgin.”
96
  Whereas it is one thing to hope 
for salvation and to have faith in Jesus, it is another, and perhaps more materialistic thing, 
to find it necessary to clarify the issue in “purely scientific” terms.    
 Belinsky’s influence on Dostoevsky was to radicalize this philosophy.  
Dostoevsky first met Belinsky in the spring of 1845, though their friendship did not 
kindle until the spring of 1847, at which time Belinsky helped to drive the views of the 
young Dostoevsky to the ideological left.
97
  Sandoz has noted that in Belinksy’s 
philosophy there is an attention to practical action which would appeal to a member of 
the Petrashevsky circle: “like Petrashevsky and other contemporary revolutionists, and 
most notably like Karl Marx, Belinsky was not so much interested in abstract speculation 
as he was in concrete praxis.”
98
  In Belinsky the exalted aims of the Petrashevsky are 
compromised by the necessity to act upon them, motivated by the gnostic belief that 
salvation from the world can be brought about by men’s doing: 
“. . . And that will be effected through sociality.  And hence there is no object more noble 
and lofty than to contribute towards its progress and development.  But it is absurd to 
imagine that this could happen by itself, with the aid of time, without violent changes, 
without bloodshed.  Men are so insensate that they must forcibly be led to happiness.  
And of what significance is the blood of thousands compared to the degradation and 




In the intention to take the forces of nature into the hands of man, the intellectual pursuits 
of the revolutionaries overstep the bounds of reality; this attempt compromises the 
existing structure of being.    The attempt to rectify the situation is executed via a gnostic 
system, founded upon the idea that a change in human nature can be enacted through an 
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historical process and that the gnostic himself can provide a formula for achieving this 
goal.  Sandoz calls this formula for action the “pivotal ideological conception of 
Belinsky.”
100
  But Belinsky’s system is constructed on the qualification that “the blood of 
thousands” will be required for man to “forcibly be led to happiness.”  In Belinsky 
murder must be condoned for the sake of the cause, and the once idyllic notions of the 
Petrashevsky are corrupted with the advice that happiness lies on the other side of murder.  
The appeal, perhaps once sincere and for the sake of humanity, is demeaned because it is 
built at the cost of that for which the system was constructed.   
Dostoevsky admits in The Diary of a Writer (1873) that at the time of their 
acquaintanceship he had “passionately accepted” all Belinsky had to offer.
101
  In the 
acceptance of Belinsky, Dostoevsky accepts the central critique that would later emerge 
in his mature work: the paradox of condoning evil for the salvation of mankind.  An 
understanding of “cheap happiness” and the truth it reveals of the nature of “lofty 
suffering” are admittedly lacking in the early experiences of Dostoevsky, yet the foggy 
space between reality and imagination can lead man to found his suppositions on false 
premises.  Indeed, the passionate acceptances of such premises do not lead into the 
salvation of mankind.  Dostoevsky would learn this lesson through fervently attempting 
to bring about such salvation. 
 Dostoevsky involved himself in a radical clique of the Petrashevsky known as the 
Durov circle.  The true purpose of the meetings of this group is unknown, but it is 
generally speculated that it was to establish a secret printing press and thereby to inspire 
the serfs to mobilize into revolution.  The involvement of Dostoevsky in the circle 
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indicates that, in his youth, it was not merely in philosophical speculations that Belinsky 
would influence Dostoevsky, but in concrete action.     
 It was, however, concrete action which would lead to the circumstances under 
which he would abandon the convictions he had developed under Belinksy’s influence.  
Dostoevsky drew attention to himself from the authorities by reading a copy of 
Belinsky’s Letter to Gogol to the Petrashevsky circle.  The passivity of the 
Petrashevsky’s attention to praxis inspired Dostoevsky to affiliate himself with the more 
radical Durov circle.  Sandoz writes that “the stimulus of these associations helped to 
educate Dostoevsky and also led him to isolate and reject the central metaphysical tenet 
of positivism, materialism, and radical socialism: namely, atheism.”
102
 While this is true, 
it is only a partial truth.  It was not the experience or affiliation with the Petrashevsky or 
Durov circles, or even the influence of Belinsky himself that would inspire Dostoevsky to 
turn on his youthful daydreams, but the ten years spent behind bars in which he was able 
to see the logic of his youthful philosophy through to its end.   
 Dostoevsky was arrested, along with Petrashevsky and thirty-two other members 
of his circle, on April 22, 1849, and brought upon the following charges: 
“Retired Lieutenant Dostoevsky for having taken part in criminal designs, having 
circulated a letter by the writer Belinsky which was filled with impertinent expressions 
against the Orthodox Church and the sovereign power and for having attempted, together 
with others, to circulate works against the government through means of a private 
printing press, is to be stripped of all the rights owing to his station, and to be exiled to 




Although this was the sentence as handed down by Nikolai I, he had stipulated that the 
criminals be led to believe they were sentenced to death.  Only moments before he 
thought his death was to come, Dostoevsky was informed that his sentence had been 
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commuted to a prison term.  He wrote to his brother, within hours of that experience, and 
the knowledge that Siberia awaited: 
“Brother, I’m not depressed and haven’t lost spirit.  Life everywhere is life, life is in 
ourselves and not in the external.  There will be people near me, and to be a human 
among human beings, and remain one forever, no matter what misfortunes befall, not to 
become depressed and not to falter – this is what life is, herein lies its task.  I have come 
to recognize this.”
104
   
 
Mochulsky writes that “the scaffold proved a crucial event in the writer’s life.  His life 
was ‘split in two,’ the past was ended, there began another existence, a ‘rebirth in a new 
form.’”
105
  This new form is assumed in the writings of the mature Dostoevsky.  
Although his life may have been split in 1849 he would sit in a prison cell for years 
thereafter, and the toll of that sentence would allow the philosophical depth of the 
intensely creative genius to unfold into a variegated but persistent affirmation of the 
value of life in the face of suffering.  To live is to suffer as well as it is many other things, 
and therein a “lofty suffering” emerges as the better choice against a “cheap happiness” 
founded on the attempted negation of certain ineradicable aspects of life itself.  The 
happiness is cheap because it is incomplete; it does not fulfill the whole range of human 
experience.  The happiness of the whole may not be utopian like the one a gnostic system 
might attempt to create, but all humans suffer sometimes.  The happiness of the whole 
range of human nature expresses itself as deference to the Question and the open 
acceptance of the Answer given.  The attempt to change the fundamental experience of 
humanity is the attempt to change the Answer to the Question, to arrange the existence of 
things differently and therefore to deny God as the Creator.  In this denial, however, man 
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only finds that the responsibility inherent in adopting the role of Creator for himself leads 
into greater suffering.    
 Dostoevsky realized this truth in his dark cell, and it is nowhere more evident than 
in the example of Ivan Karamazov.  No one loves life, and “the sticky leaves,” more than 
Ivan.
106
  Ivan is willing to negate God in order to make the whole of mankind happy.  But 
he cannot escape the logical disjunction of his philosophy, that “everything is lawful.”  If 
everything is permitted then murder is permitted all the same, and the suffering of 
innocents against which he is avowed must be condoned in its turn.  This realization, 
brought about by the actions of Smerdyakov, drives Ivan insane.   
 The intoxication of Ivan’s arguments is juxtaposed by the mystical naturalism of 
Zosima and the moral integrity it inspires in Alyosha.  The polarity between the 
embodied ideals of Ivan and Alyosha is central to Dostoevsky’s thought, and to our 
dilemma as whole.  At the perigee is the appeal of paradise in the immanent world.  At 
the apogee lies the less immanently appealing recognition of suffering, the 
acknowledgement of moral obligations, individual responsibility and the understanding 
that paradise is not of this world.  The intoxication of the perigee lies in that it promises 
to manifest the apogee onto itself  the apogee’s logical polar juxtaposition  although 
the very essence of the apogee is that it opposes the perigee.  The appeal does not make 
sense and consequently is bound to fail to become manifest in a conscionable and 
practicable institution.  Dostoevsky’s purpose within these counterpoints, therefore, is to 
encourage the reader towards the apogee.  
Thus in Dostoevsky appears the prophetic and desperate rebellion against the 
materialistic socialist creeds of the day, as an affirmation of God’s creation.  D.H. 
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Lawrence has written that each time he reads The Brothers Karamazov he finds it “more 
depressing because, alas, more drearily true to life . . . it is a deadly, devastating summing 
up, unanswerable because borne out by the long experience of humanity.”
107
  If it is 
depressing it is at least laudable science.  Recalling Aristotle’s dedication to truth despite 
predilection, Dostoevsky’s “unanswerable” depiction is so because it is an honest account 
of the human experience.  The appeal to “lofty suffering” is in the end a qualitatively 
different appeal than that made by materialistic socialism, and the distinction lies in a 
dedication to man’s conscious experience as man.  The recognition that the utopian 
dreams of his youth were flawed by a theoretical fallacy provides the honest, self-critical 
and humble condition upon which Dostoevsky’s “therapeutic analysis” is founded.      
 Dostoevsky’s literature is the medium of his criticism of metaphysical rebellion.  
It will be examined relative to Eric Voegelin’s insights on modern gnosticism and 
consciousness.  The analysis of Dostoevsky, drawing from the selected works, The 
Brothers Karamazov and Crime and Punishment, will depict the descent into 
metaphysical rebellion from the perspectives of gnostic thinker and ideological rabble, 
sketching the end form of metaphysical rebellion to be totalitarianism.  An argument will 
be made depicting the essence of such institutions as evil, relying upon the mental 
experiences Dostoevsky conveys.  With the recognition of evil comes either the turn from 
the beliefs a metaphysical rebel might hold, or the acceptance of evil by that man.  The 
characters of individuals who make both choices will be analyzed, revealing the 
motivating force which drives such a choice to be the ground of attunement, either 
immanent or transcendent, to which an individual is directed.  The choice to turn from 
evil relies upon insights from the selected works, as well as an aside about the antihero of 
                                                
107
 Ibid.  pg. 829 
 51
Notes from Underground, which identifies an attunement to the transcendent ground as 
founded in the ineradicable dictates of man’s conscience.  This turn thrusts the 
conscionable individual into political rebellion against a domineering totalitarian regime 
that had inculcated in him the beliefs that he now understands to be false.  Hence the 
analysis to follow will sketch the cumulative process of metaphysical rebellion: from the 
initial acceptance of it, into depravity, and finally into the point at which a rebellion is 
identifiably evil and man must choose either to adhere to its tenets or to vacillate from his 
positions.  Dostoevsky reveals through the consequences of this choice that man can 
always change the way he looks at the world, even if the world itself cannot be affected.  
The need to rent the world, and the interminable misery such an urge delivers, can be 
eradicated by breaking the way man thinks of himself.  
 The argument has been broken down in a manner consistent with Voegelin’s 
theories of gnosticism and of consciousness.  It begins with the dissatisfaction and 
speculative construction of the gnostic thinker, proceeds through the disaffection and 
gnostic tendencies of the ideological rabble.  The consequences of the metaphysical 
rebellion are then discussed, followed by an analysis of the discovery of consciousness as 
the impetus of the turn away from gnostic beliefs.  The argument concludes with an 
analysis of the way in which such a turn might occur, through the example of the antihero.  
The antihero reveals the immanent problems inherent to political rebellion, leading into 
the thought of Václav Havel. 
II 
 The first indicative attribute of metaphysical rebellion is that of dissatisfaction 
with one’s situation.  In the case of the gnostic thinker a second reality arises from a 
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theoretical quibble with the nature of existence.  For the ideological rabble it arises with 
the indulgence in a second reality prompted by one’s condition.  The indulgence in a 
second reality prompts the rabble to accept the quibble raised by the gnostic thinker.     
 Ivan Karamazov is a metaphysical rebel who displays characteristics of a gnostic 
thinker.  His rebellion is driven by a theoretical quibble with the nature of man’s 
existence as man.  He does not rebel against the experience of any regime but against the 
world at large; Ivan proclaims: “in the final result I don’t accept this world of God’s, and, 
although I know it exists, I don’t accept it at all.”
108
  Ivan knows of the tenets of existence, 
“it’s not God I don’t respect,” but he denies the conditions of those tenets nonetheless, 
“only I most respectfully return to him the ticket.”
109
  Ivan, however, remains a human 
being in affirmation of something.  He does not liken himself to a rebel; when Alyosha 
accuses him of being in rebellion Ivan retorts: “Rebellion?  I am sorry you call it that.  
One can hardly live in rebellion and I want to live.”
110
  His rebellion is driven like all 
rebellions, against dissatisfaction with condition and the hope for a better way of living.  
But the distinction between metaphysical and political rebellion lies in the grounds upon 
which dissatisfaction is founded, and the foundations of Ivan’s condition qualify as 
metaphysical rebellion.   
 The suffering of innocent children motivates Ivan’s revolt.  Although suffering 
has forever been inherent to God’s world, it is suffering against which Ivan rebels: “If all 
must suffer to pay for the eternal harmony, what have children to do with it, tell me, 
please?  It’s beyond all comprehension why they should suffer, and why they should pay 
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  As Ivan remains in affirmation of something, his plight is to 
develop a means by which suffering can be eradicated from the human experience.  His 
rejection of the “entrance ticket” is the rejection of an “eternal harmony.”
112
  He seeks, 
therefore, a worldly harmony.  He tells Alyosha:  
“Surely I haven’t suffered, simply that I, my crimes and my sufferings, may manure the 
soil of the future harmony for somebody else.  I want to see with my own eyes the hind 
lie down with the lion and the victim rise up and embrace his murderer.  I want to be 
there when everyone suddenly understands what it has all been for.”
113
   
 
The immanent attunement of his disposition is clear and confessed: “what pulls me up 
here is that I can’t accept that harmony.  And while I am on earth, I make haste to take 
my own measures . . . I hasten to protect myself and so I renounce the higher harmony 
altogether.”
114
  In order to protect himself and realize a worldly harmony, Ivan must 
develop a system for bringing about such a reality.   
 Ivan’s system is designed to restructure the nature of man’s existence so that the 
suffering of innocent children cannot occur.  This system is reliant upon the development 
of a “new man.”
115
  The design is recounted to Ivan by a hallucination of the devil:  
“Men will unite to take from life all it can give, but only for joy and happiness in the 
present world.  Man will be lifted up with a spirit of divine Titanic pride and the man-god 
will appear.  For hour to hour extending his conquest of nature infinitely by his will and 
his science, man will feel such lofty joy from hour to hour in doing it that it will make up 
for all his old dreams of the joys of heaven.  Everyone will know that he is mortal and 
will accept death proudly and serenely like a God.  His pride will teach him that it’s 
useless for him to repine at life’s being a moment, and he will love his brother without 
need of reward.”
116
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The realization of this experience is, however, reliant upon a qualitative change in the 
nature of mankind; the devil pits “the new man” or “the man-god” against “the old-slave 
man.”
117
  The new man’s realization is founded upon the dictum “all things are 
lawful.”
118
  The new man must be aware of this dictum and disregard any recognition of 
obligations to the transcendent ground of truth.  New man “may lightly overstep all the 
barriers of the old morality of the old slave-man, if necessary.”
119
  In order to do this 
however, man must assume the responsibilities of God: “There is no law for God.  Where 
God stands, the place is holy.  Where I stand will be at once the foremost place . . . ‘all 
things are lawful’ and that’s the end of it!”
120
  Although Ivan remains a human being in 
affirmation of something, his affirmation is one that negates the transcendent ground.  
The affirmation of Ivan’s man-god rests upon the abnegation of moral obligation.  
Innocent children do not suffer because the new man has no conception of guilt or 
innocence.  
 Ivan develops a means for creating the new man, and conveys the idea to his 
brother in the chapter entitled “The Grand Inquisitor.”  It is a story envisioning the 
conditions upon which the new man can be realized in historical reality.  As the moral 
obligations of the old slave-man inhibit this realization, the Grand Inquisitor develops a 
political prognostication in which such obligations can be overstepped by erasing them 
from the realm of man’s conscience.  Thus the Inquisitor’s purpose is gnostic 
systemization; it disregards empirical evidence and speculates upon the possible nature of 










a transfigured man.  The system can be revealed as speculative visa vie attempts within it 
to conceal the obligatory constraints of morality on action.   
 The Inquisitor distinguishes between worldly and eternal goods.  His system is 
designed to make man happy by conditioning him only to care for the worldly goods.  He 
argues that man cannot be fulfilled by transcendent duties because man is naturally 
endowed with mundane desires that conflict with those duties.  In his view, eternal goods 
are mere obstacles to worldly well-being.  He argues to Christ: 
“Instead of taking men’s freedom from them, Thou didst make it greater than ever!  Didst 
Thou forget that man prefers peace, and even death, to freedom of choice in the 
knowledge of good and evil?  Nothing is more seductive for man than his freedom of 
conscience, but nothing is a greater cause of suffering.  And behold, instead of giving a 
firm foundation for setting the conscience of man at rest forever, Thou didst choose what 
was utterly beyond the strength of all men, acting as though  Thou didst not love them at 
all – Thou who didst come to give Thy life for them!  Instead of taking possession of 
men’s freedom, Thou didst increase it, and burdened the spiritual kingdom of mankind 




Because of man’s fallen nature, because “man was created a rebel,” freedom of 
conscience confounds the conditions of men’s happiness.
122
  In a spiritual sense, man can 
never be happy because he can never cease to wrong his brethren.  As Father Zosima puts 
it: “in truth we are each responsible to all for all, it’s only that men don’t know this.  If 
they knew it, the world would be a paradise at once.”
123
  Freedom of conscience is 
confounding because man is forced to live a life in which he necessarily commits 
atrocities from which springs spiritual suffering.  The Inquisitor argues that given the 
nature of man, happiness will only be attained by a few in making choices consistent with 
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the freedom represented by Christ. He asks of Christ: “And how are the other weak ones 
to blame, because they could not endure what the strong have endured?”
124
 
The book of John tells us that the freedom of Christ is discovered through the 
revelation of truth: “you shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.”
125
  
Although the truth makes man free, it does so in a qualified manner and only in relation 
to the bondage analogized in Plato’s cave.  It attunes man to the “difficult truth” rendered 
upon the foundation of “a desire to know.”  Christ’s freedom provides liberation from the 
unalienable suffering of mundane existence, but not because it eliminates the suffering 
inherent to that existence; it provides freedom from the intoxicating hold of mundane 
satiety by making worldly goods categorically inferior to the truth realized through an 
attunement to the transcendent ground.  As the Inquisitor frames it, such an attunement 
places a grave burden on man.  His mundane predilection is both natural and necessary.  
Man is an organic being which must eat and drink; an attunement to eternal truth is too 
much to ask of a species so easily driven to distraction. 
The Inquisitor therefore “corrects” the Lord’s work.
126
  God’s solution provides 
comfort to mundane suffering by attuning man’s interest elsewhere.  It does not, however, 
do away with such suffering.  It creates additional suffering because it adds the element 
of spiritual suffering to the inevitable mundane suffering.  In order to correct the Lord’s 
work the Inquisitor’s system attempts to eradicate spiritual suffering by ignoring those 
interests, therefore allowing man to fulfill his mundane desires.  Ivan’s dictum that 
“everything is lawful” provides the foundation for this correction.  By providing freedom 
in an unqualified sense, man is released from the bounds of moral obligation and eternal 
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truth.  He is, however, returned to a state of bondage in which the demands of his worldly 
urgings become his prison.  Metaphysical rebellion delivers man into a state of mundane 
absolutism which, lacking attunement to eternal obligations, places man’s sole interest in 




 The end result of the Inquisitor’s design is professed to be “the universal 
happiness of mankind . . . one unanimous and harmonious anthill . . . a universal state.”
128
  
His system provides a way in which the universal salvation of mankind can be 
theoretically achieved.  This design, however, is constructed around the obfuscation of 
the transcendent ground of truth.  Consistent with the “prohibition of questions” and 
“intellectual swindle” that Eric Voegelin has identified to be inherent to gnostic 
constructions, are the deceptions undertaken in support of Ivan’s design.  The Inquisitor 
understands that if he is to found a universal state of mankind driven by mundane 
attunement there can be no questions regarding the existence of eternal truth.  The 
mystery of the eternal realm must be somehow replaced or duplicated in immanent terms.  
The Inquisitor states:  
“They will marvel at us and look on us as gods, because we are ready to endure the 
freedom which they have found so dreadful and to rule over them – so awful it will seem 
to them to be free.  But we shall tell them that we are Thy servants and rule them in Thy 
name.  We shall deceive them again, for we will not let Thee come to us again.  That 




A similarity between the Inquisitor’s design and Marx’s gnostic system arises in the 
proclamation of god as inherent to man, and in deceptions perpetrated in order to conceal 
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  Marxian atheism is not atheism per se, rather it simply claims that God 
cannot be questioned: “[Existence begins] from the practically and theoretically sensuous 
consciousness of man and of nature as the essence.”
131
  Yet because he understands 
nature as developed through “history” and “industry”, whatever man may will to create of 
nature may be actualized, as existence begins within man himself.
132
  In making such a 
proclamation, Marx has effectively prohibited questions regarding a misplacement of the 
ground without, likewise, denying the existence of that ground.  He claims to be 
clairvoyant concerning the essence of nature, which he has placed in man, but will add 
that his clairvoyance cannot be questioned.   
The Inquisitor, like Marx, misplaces the ground of being in anthropological 
devises and proclaims such devises to be in accord with eternal truth.  The Inquisitor 
speaks of this misplacement as an active concealment of the transcendent ground: “Didst 
thou not often say then, ‘I will make you free’?  . . . But let me tell Thee that now, today, 
people are more persuaded than ever that they have perfect freedom, yet they have 
brought that freedom to us and laid it humbly at our feet.  But that has been our doing.”
133
  
This deception is perpetrated visa vie the prohibition of questions.  The Inquisitor states 
to Christ: “We will not let thee come to us again.”
134
  The Inquisitor’s unanimous 
harmony is consequent only of the denial of eternal truth.  His worldly harmony 
dissipates if the eternal truth is considered, breaking down by his very own distinction 
between strong souls and “weak ones . . .  [that] could not endure what the strong have 
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   Because the Inquisitor knows such a truth to exist, his system is a lie 
dependent upon a deception which negates the transcendent ground of that truth.  His 
fraud is an “intellectual swindle” because it knowingly vitiates the true human experience.  
The consequences of his deception are ideological followers willing to murder for the 
sake of the anthill.  With a bold face, he tells Jesus Christ: “tomorrow Thou shalt see that 
obedient flock who at a sign from me will hasten to heap up the hot cinders about the pile 




 The gnostic thinker’s deception results in the institution of a totalitarian regime as 
revealed by the product of the Grand Inquisitor’s design: a rabble willing to kill anyone 
that disagrees with or does not conform to the dictates of the ideology spewed by the 
gnostic thinker.  Totalitarianism, however, is wholly dependent upon this “obedient 
flock” or ideological rabble.  Smerdyakov represents this rabble; he acts upon Ivan’s 
ravings.  He kills Ivan’s father, Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov, and justifies his crime to 
Ivan in the following manner: 
“I did dream of it, chiefly because ‘all things are lawful.’  That was quite right what you 
taught me, for you talked a lot to me about that.  For if there’s no everlasting God, there’s 





Smerdyakov’s disillusionment was derived from the “dream of it” he made for himself.  
This dream constitutes the condition upon which the gnostic thinker’s deception creates 
an ideological rabble inclined to the gnostic’s system.  The idea that “all things are 
lawful” is one that is easier to instill in those whose worldly necessities are wanting.  In 
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the ideological rabble the ‘children suffer’ of the gnostic thinker is replaced by an ‘I 
suffer.’  Smerdyakov killed and stole from Ivan’s father because, “I did have an idea of 
beginning a new life. . . .”
138
  Dostoevsky develops this tendency of the desperate with 
greater lucidity in Crime and Punishment, through the character Raskolnikov.      
Raskolnikov’s rebellion arises from the “impossibility or untenability” presented 
by his condition, leading him to misplace the ground of his actions in the mundane realm.  
Unlike the gnostic thinker’s theoretical rebellion, the ideological rabble is moved by a 
proposition to which they themselves can relate.  The structure of Crime and Punishment 
identifies Raskolnikov with the rebellion of the ideological rabble; he is persuaded by a 
series of events in his own life to adopt a role akin to Ivan’s new men.  Unlike Ivan his 
rebellion is not grounded in gnostic speculation but in the adoption of gnostic ideas 
offered from various sources.  Raskolnikov’s choice to adopt the idea, as Ivan thought of 
it, that man should “lightly overstep all the barriers of the old morality of the old slave-
man, if necessary,” is reinforced by the dire situation of his own life.  His personal 
situation leads him to overlook the impossibility of moral bounds; the oversight is made 
because he is grounded in the fantasy world of a man without barriers.     
 The novel opens with images of an embittered young man, alienated from 
happiness by the depravity of his condition: “there was such accumulated bitterness and 
contempt in the young man’s heart that, in spite of all the fastidiousness of youth, he 
minded his rags least of all in the street.”
139
  He drinks in sordid taverns and the squalor is 
both unbearable and inescapable.  Disdain for the world and his implacable condition 
therein engender the desire for another world in which to live: “He was so weary after a 
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month of concentrated wretchedness and gloomy excitement that he longed to rest, if 
only for a moment, in some other world, whatever that might be.”
140
  Although unaware 
of any possibility for salvation from his condition, his understanding of his life as 
somehow unjust is amplified by his conversation with Marmeladov in the tavern and by 
the letter received from his mother.    
Marmeladov affirms the conviction that “. . . every man must have somewhere to 
go.  Since there are times when one absolutely must go somewhere!”
141
  This position is 
facilitated by the nature of worldly experience, in particular with the unbearable nature of 
dependence: “In poverty you may still retain your innate nobility of soul, but in beggary –
never – no one.”
142
  Marmeladov’s predilection for the bottle, however, precludes his 
ability to provide for his family.  But the inability to provide drives his tendency to drink; 
the paradox his situation presents is the possibility that if man’s mundane necessities 
were fulfilled then perhaps all would be well, that if man could provide for himself he 
would not drink himself into buffoonery.  Raskolnikov, not unaffected by the 
conversation, leaves the money in his pocket on Marmeladov’s windowsill as he 
retires.
143
  He has begun the quest to improve man’s material condition.  The urgency of 
the enterprise is heightened by the circumstances surrounding Raskolnikov’s own 
familial situation. 
His mother’s letter conveys the story of his sister’s marriage to Pyotr Petrovitch 
Luzhin, a distinguished counselor to whom both mother and sister are unwarrantedly and 
incautiously obsequious.  Raskolnikov detects that the promised future generosity of 
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Luzhin will not manifest as foreseen by mother and sister, that mother’s and sister’s 
happiness depends upon an evil man, thus leaving them no where to go: 
“So she is building all her hopes all the time on Mr. Luzhin’s generosity . . . till the last 
moment, they hope for the best and will see nothing wrong, and although they have an 
inkling of the other side of the picture, yet they won’t face the truth till they are forced to; 
the very thought of it makes them shiver; they thrust the truth away with both hands, until 




To make matters worse, his mother additionally places in Luzhin the role of employer for 
Raskolnikov.  The perception of reality as utterly dependent  essentially beggarly and 
lacking any foreseeable future other than the one in the hands of Luzhin  leads 
Raskolnikov’s fantasy to become necessity:  
“His mother’s letter had burst on him like a thunderclap.  It was clear that he must not 
now suffer passively, worrying himself over unresolved questions, but that he must do 
something, do it at once and do it quickly.  Anyway he must decide on something, or 
else. . . . Or throw up life altogether!”
145
   
 
Raskolnikov is thus affected by his dissatisfaction towards his circumstance; his whole 
effort is from this point focused around the alleviation of his condition. 
 Although Raskolnikov’s rebellion can accurately be described as being against his 
experience as man, not as citizen, he develops a means through which his attempt can, in 
his eyes, be validated.  The construction of a dream-world provides the inspiration from 
which Raskolnikov is convinced that the mundane experience of life can be dramatically 
improved.  While it is true that life can be improved, the means of improving it are 
always qualified.  Raskolnikov’s attunement is revealed to be unqualified because it is 
turned towards the ends for which his actions are directed, rather than towards the means 
by which such ends can be achieved.  The construction leads Raskolnikov towards a state 
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of, as Voegelin described it, “spiritual illiteracy.”  Moral disorientation becomes evident 
as the idea of the dream begins to become tenable:  
“the difference was that a month ago, yesterday even the thought was a mere dream: but 
now . . . now it appeared no dream at all, it had taken a new meaning and quite unfamiliar 
shape, and he suddenly became aware of this himself . . . . He felt a hammering in his 




This “hammering” is a consequence of the fact that he must confront the bleak nature of 
the act he must commit if he is to transfigure his reality as it is imagined.  The 
confrontation is overcome by focusing more upon his end than his means of establishing 
that end.  When planning the crime his mind is not moved by the act itself.  Instead, he is 
driven by the dream-like conception of a transfigured reality that would emerge upon the 
deed’s execution.  As the crime is being devised, the forthcoming reality is envisioned, 
on one exemplary occasion, to be bucolic and tranquil.  This belief is expressed in 
Raskolnikov’s experience in the countryside: 
“The greenness and freshness were at first restful to his weary eyes after the dust of the 
town and the huge houses that hemmed him in and weighed upon him.  Here there were 
no taverns, no stifling closeness, no stench.  But soon these new pleasant sensations 
passed into morbid irritability.  Sometimes he stood still before a brightly painted 
summer villa standing among green foliage, he gazed through the fence, he say in the 
distance smartly dressed women on the verandas and balconies, and children running in 
the gardens.  The flowers especially caught his attention; he gazed at them long than at 
anything.  He was met, too, by luxurious carriages and by men and women on horseback; 




The dream reality disjoined from his current condition by this “morbid irritability” allows 
him to conjure a transfigured world for himself  one characterized by the beautiful 
scenery and the big houses that depraved men dream of; he yearns for these things but 
understands that the dreamed transfiguration is not reality.  That night he dreams of a 
mare being thrashed to death, and of being unable to understand the necessity of such 
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suffering.  He awakes still unconvinced that suffering condones crime, but tempted and 
contemplating the “darkness and confusion . . . in his soul.”
148
  His nightmare of 
unjustified suffering is leading him to believe that the abatement of physical suffering is 
perhaps justifiable, regardless of means, because of the horror of suffering.  He is now 
contemplating with all seriousness: “Good God, can it be?”
149
  
 Raskolnikov’s train of thought is affected by his impressionability.  The 
possibility of mundane fulfillment as a panacea for man’s woes has been reinforced by 
external influences, such as Marmeladov and his mother, as well as internal influences, 
namely his own circumstance and his own imagination.  The end result is a dream-world 
in which Raskolnikov can envision the forthcoming bliss of mundane fulfillment.  
Although moral obstacles have thus far preempted action, Raskolnikov is finally 
compelled to act after eavesdropping in a tavern.  He hears a group of officers talking, 
and is moved to the following rationale: 
“. . . fresh young lives are thrown away for want of help by the thousands, on every side!  
A hundred thousand good deeds could be done and helped, on that old woman’s money 
which will be buried in a monastery!  Hundreds, thousands perhaps, might be set on the 
right path; dozens of families saved from destitution, from ruin, from vice, from the Lock 
hospitals – and all with her money.  Kill her, take her money and with the help of it 
devote oneself to the service of humanity and the good of all.  What do you think, would 
not one tiny crime be wiped out by thousands of good deeds?  For one life thousands 
would be saved from corruption and decay.  One death, and a hundred lives in exchange 
– it’s simple arithmetic!  Besides, what value has the life of that sickly, stupid, ill-natured 
old woman in the balance of existence?  No more than the life of a louse, of a black-




This mendacious logic exposes the cumulative effects of his experience and the influence 
of his dream-world: it moves Raskolnikov to kill the louse Alyona in the name of 
humanity.  The inherent immorality of the act was concealed from Raskolnikov by the 
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lofty aims that he thought would be realized upon its being done.  But when he cannot 
commit the murder and escape before Lizavetta enters to discover both her sister and her 
sister’s murderer, he kills her too.   
 The crime, therefore, becomes detectably removed from the proclaimed motive. If 
his first murder had been consistent with his aim, the second cannot be justified by the 
same standards.  Lizavetta was a character of greater depravity than Raskolnikov, but 
who happened to posses a humble and respecting soul; if salvation for the suffering could 
be ascertained by murdering the despicable Alyona, nothing evident was gained for 
humanity by murdering one who is not only innocent by Raskolnikov’s standards, but 
moreover the intended beneficiary of his crime.  Lizavetta was a woman who not only 
suffered, but by all standards of morality suffered innocently.  The loot stolen from 
Alyona, moreover, was tossed into a river; that with which he was to aid humanity, and 
for which he had committed his crime, was abandoned.  With these developments, the 
motivating factor could not conceal itself even from the perpetrator.  Dostoevsky writes 
of Raskolnikov: “It seemed to him, he had cut himself off from everyone and from 
everything at that moment.”
151
   
 The end of metaphysical rebellion reveals itself, therefore, to be fundamentally 
flawed.  Although man can improve his worldly condition, there are bounds to the ways 
in which change can occur; the effects of murder on man’s conscience are not affected by 
the justificatory rationale of the deed.  The attempt to reconstruct reality around the false 
premise that murder is a pragmatic route to happiness cannot culminate in anything but 
man’s cutting himself off from the world.  Instead we arrive at the realization that man’s 
actions can be wrong.  Raskolnikov realized that he had indeed “cut himself off from 
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everyone and from everything,” and that the rationale for his crime could not change the 
affects of it upon his conscience.  Raskolnikov felt guilty.   
IV 
 This feeling delivers man into a situation in which, as Voegelin framed it, “the 
revolt against God is revealed and recognized to be the motive of the swindle.  With the 
continuation of the intellectual swindle in full knowledge of the motive of revolt the 
deception further becomes ‘demonic mendacity.’”
152
  But the feeling of guilt is not 
always immediate or realized in men, even if the capability for it is embedded within 
each of us.  The realization of the enterprise as both fallacious and evil therefore presents 
men indulging in it with a choice to either accept or reject the validity of evil as good. 
 The Grand Inquisitor acknowledges the demonic motivations of his system: “We 
have taken the sword of Caesar, and in taking it, of course, we have rejected Thee and 
followed him.”
153
  With his acknowledged understanding of his motivations as evil, and 
the acceptance of those motivations as good, the Inquisitor realizes the necessity to 
obfuscate the understanding of good and evil: 
“We shall tell them that every sin shall be expiated, if it is done with our permission, that 
we allow them to sin because we love them, and the punishment for these sins we take 
upon ourselves.  And we shall take it upon ourselves, and they will adore us as their 
saviors who have taken on themselves their sins before God. . . . The most painful secrets 
of their conscience, all, all they will bring to us, and we shall have an answer for all.  And 
they will be glad to believe our answer, for it will save them from the great anxiety and 




The Inquisitor’s design is for a soul without understanding of the moral obligations 
instilled by an attunement to the transcendent ground of truth.  His means of achieving it 
is simply to allow all moral transgressions while focusing on the provision of mundane 
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satiety; he places the good of mundane satiety above the good which fosters moral 
obligation.  Dostoevsky’s work guides the reader to an understanding of the 
consequences of this obfuscation.  Alyosha, for example, immediately refutes the 
proclaimed loftiness of Ivan’s poem, defiling the Jesuits as:  
“. . . simply the Romish army for the earthly sovereignty of the world in the future, with 
the Pontiff of Rome for Emperor. . . . It’s simple lust for power, for filthy earthly gain, for 
domination – something like a universal serfdom with them as masters – that’s all they 
stand for.  They don’t even believe in God perhaps.  Your suffering inquisitor is a mere 
fantasy.”
155
    
 
Alyosha points out not only the idea’s earthly predisposition, but the consequences of the 
denial of the eternal truth upon which such a predisposition rests: 
“‘But the sticky leaves, and the precious tombs, and the blue sky, and the woman you 
love!  How will you live, how will you love them?’ Alyosha cried sorrowfully. ‘With 
such a hell in your heart and your head, how can you?  No, that’s just what you are going 




Here Alyosha illustrates the consequences of the revelation of metaphysical rebellion as 
evil: the acceptance of evil as good, resulting in the failure to consciously eradiate the 
transcendent ground of truth from existence culminating in insanity – even suicide – as a 
result of the interminable conflict between reality as experienced by man and the 
proposed fantasy of the gnostic thinker. 
Ivan’s character is a portrayal of this conflict as it might play out; he identifies 
Alyosha’s concerns over suicide to be prophetic.  Ivan set out with his Inquisitor to 
assuage the innocent suffering of the world, but in the end he failed to achieve this goal.  
In the theoretical world of the Inquisitor he has succeeded in eliminating morality from 
existence.  There is no longer guilt or innocence and therefore no longer innocent 
suffering; but suffering persists.  Because morality does not exist innocent children might 
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not suffer, but children will suffer.  The annihilation of morality will not change the fact 
that children in the world suffer.  As Camus writes: 
 “Man can master in himself everything that should be mastered.  He should rectify in 
creation everything that should be rectified.  And after he has done so, children will still 
die unjustly even in a perfect society.  Even by his greatest effort man can only propose 
to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world.  But the injustice and the suffering 
of the world will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an 
outrage.”
157
   
 
His recalcitrance, in spite of these problems, reveals his motive to be “demonic 
mendacity.”  The consequences of this acceptance are confounding for Ivan.  Camus 
notes that “the same man who so violently took the part of innocence, from the moment 
he rejects divine coherence and tries to discover his own rule of life, recognizes the 
legitimacy of murder.”
158
  Faced with a devastating contradiction, Ivan must either 
condone murder or admit to his place within God’s world.  Unable to find justice in either 
alternative, his rebellion culminates in, as Sandoz puts it: “the incomprehending yet 
guilty horror . . . that his egregious verbal and metaphysical diarrhea induced the actual 
murder of his father. . . .”
159
  The Inquisitor himself affirmed that those responsible for 
the deception of the rabble would be unhappy, and this insight is consistent with the 
development of Ivan’s character.  He becomes involved in assuming God-like 
responsibilities, the consequences of which are appropriately summed up by Voegelin in 
Science, Politics, and Gnosticism: “to rule means to be God; in order to be God gnostic 
man takes upon himself the torments of deception and self-laceration.”
160
  The nonsense 
of these deceptions affected those around him; consequently the murderer, Smerdyakov, 
whose actions were only produced by the stupidity of the ideological rabble, hangs 
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himself; it cannot be said that he finds happiness in this end.  Hence, Dostoevsky depicts 
through the representatives of Smerdyakov and Ivan that given the Inquisitor’s design, no 
one, neither clever nor innocent, becomes happy.  
 Dostoevsky develops the characteristics of such societies as exclusively disposed 
to worldly inclinations.  On the Inquisitor, for example, the silent argument of Christ falls 
deaf: “The kiss glows in his heart, but the old man adheres to his idea.”
161
  The Inquisitor 
represents a man with no inclination towards anything beyond materialism, his 
willingness to kill Christ in the name of that materialism exposes his nature to be utterly 
evil.  In Crime and Punishment, Dostoevsky depicts the domineering as essentially evil, 
sometimes describing such characters as tyrannical.  Such an exposition further identifies 
the desperation and depravity that is a consequence of being exclusively disposed to 
worldly inclination.   
 In addition to Raskolnikov’s action, this picture is developed particularly through 
Svidrigaïlov and Luzhin.  Both characters posses the desire to maintain a sort of 
dominance over their surroundings.  Both seek to maintain a master/slave dynamic  and 
to be the master  amongst their relations.  This trait is characteristic of an attunement to 
mundane satiety; it leaves behind evidence of the infringement of Locke’s conception of 
respecting the “lives, liberties . . . and properties” of one another.  Therefore, the 
development of these characters depicts the nature of tyrannical behavior to be consistent 
with behavior derived from an infatuation with mundane fulfillment. 
Luzhin’s illustration of the characteristics of tyranny affirms a persistent 
preoccupation with worldly dominion.  Indeed, Raskolnikov is not amiss to suspect 
Luzhin’s dastardly intentions towards his kin.  The nature of Luzhin’s relationship to 
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Dounia and Pulcheria Alexandrovna is in fact not one of love but of one of conquest.  
Upon the exposure of his nature to them, and their consequent rejection of him, he thinks 
to himself:  
“It was my mistake, too, not to have given them money . . . if I’d spent some fifteen 
hundred roubles on them for the trousseau and presents . . . my position would have been 
better and . . . stronger!  They are the sort of people that would feel bound to return 
money and presents if they broke it off; and they would find hard to do it!  And their 
conscience would prick them: how can we dismiss a man who has hitherto been so 
generous and delicate? . . . H’m! I’ve made a blunder.”
162
   
 
The fact that these women had placed all of their being in his hands was a source of 
malevolent fulfillment and, in turn, of dejection for him.  The permeation of mundane 
conquest with an all-or-nothing stake in mundane affairs exposes the ground of Luzhin’s 
motivation to be unabashedly immanent.  Dostoevsky exposes the consequences of 
Luzhin’s worldly conquests through the similarly disposed character Svidrigaïlov.   
Svidrigaïlov is spoken of as a “villain and tyrant.”
163
  He thrives on womanizing, 
and the manipulation of others which facilitates his dominance over social circumstances.  
With such dominance comes the role of provider in an extreme sense.  Like the Inquisitor, 
dominance over one’s peers manifests in Svidrigaïlov as an attempt to both provide 
substantive support and to recreate moral and conscious predilections in a manner 
consistent with his design, as Alyosha put it, “for power, for filthy earthly gain, for 
domination . . . .”
164
  This craving is revealed particularly through his willingness to 
accept for himself the role of God which is revealed through his desire to manipulate the 
wills of those surrounding him; yet Locke established “liberties” as an inherent necessity 
to the social contract because the power over one’s own will is a dispensation whose 
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manipulation is reserved for divine ordinance.  The contradiction between his design and 
what has been conceived of in this essay as a legitimate and fair design implies that a 
fallacy underlies his system and that it therefore leads into unforeseen consequences. 
Svidrigaïlov stakes everything upon his ability to shape existences.  His ultimate 
design is for Dounia; a desire seeded in his tendency to womanize.  The end of 
Svidrigaïlov’s particular system was the love of a woman that did not love, and could not 
consciously conceive of loving him.  He, unaware of any truth beyond materialism, 
stakes everything upon the achievement of his plan.  But Dounia spurns him, making his 
designs untenable.  Having staked everything upon this plan, he feels at a complete and 
irreconcilable loss: “There followed a moment of terrible, dumb struggle in the heart of 
Svidrigaïlov.  He looked at her with an indescribable gaze.”
165
   Svidrigaïlov did not 
abandon the loyalties to the all-or-nothingness of his system; instead he shot himself.        
  The psychological dimension of staking everything upon a worldly enterprise is 
central to the greater issue of political philosophy because it renders social consequences 
that stem from the spiritual disorientation apparent at the individual level.   Camus has 
put it succinctly: “One step more and from All or Nothing we arrive at Everyone or No 
one.”
166
  The Inquisitor’s design is for a global community of likeminded individuals, of 
which none except the Jesuits are aware of the true nature of that community.  He argues: 
“only we, we who guard the mystery, will be unhappy.”
167
  The system is therefore 
dependent on the unanimous acceptance of it, and totalitarian governance is a tool for 
deriving unanimity from a mass of uniquely individual human beings.  Hence, the 
tyrannical tendencies of Luzhin and Svidrigaïlov are the roots from which springs 
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political and existential horror on a societal scale, culminating in a body of individuals 
that cannot think independently of the system offered, for, as the Inquisitor argues, their 
very happiness is dependent upon the validity of the system.   
This validity is, however, derived from the lack of anyone possessing a “desire to 
know.”  The existence of totalitarian systems resides on this fact.  Attunement to moral 
obligations instilled by the transcendent ground of truth, however, places man in active 
conflict against the proclamations dispelling moral obligations purported by gnostic 
systemization.  The conflict between the purported truth of a system and the transcendent 
ground of truth that man himself experiences to be valid results in the psychological 
digression into insanity and, as Svidrigaïlov and Smerdyakov illustrate, sometimes 
suicide.  But thankfully, built into the pneumopathology of metaphysical rebellion is its 
remedy, the “difficult” act of attuning oneself to the ineradicable pangs of being a 
creature amongst created beings.   
V 
 Attunement is thus facilitated through the experience of the conscience.  For 
Raskolnikov, this experience unveiled the fallacy and criminality underlying his actions. 
After the murder his ability to logically connect his actions to any normative scheme had 
dissipated:  
“If it all has really been done deliberately and not idiotically, if I really had a certain and 
definite object, how is it I did not even glance into the purse and don’t know what I had 
there, for which I have undergone these agonies, and have deliberately undertaken this 
base, filthy, degrading business?  And here I wanted at once to throw into the water the 
purse together with all the things which I had not seen either . . . how’s that?”
168
   
 
Raskolnikov is realizing for himself the evil nature of his actions.  His response to this 
realization will differentiate him from those who continue to indulge in fantasies 
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grounded in an all-or-nothing qualification.  As his impressionability led him to accept 
the fallacy of the gnostic system, his relationship with Sonia impresses on him the 
realization that his quest was engendered from a desire to overstep the bounds of being, 
“to become a Napoleon,” as he puts it.
169
  Raskolnikov understands this quest to be 
demonically motivated: “I know myself that it was the devil leading me.”
170
  He 
understands the source of this motivation to be haughtiness:  
“And you don’t suppose that I went into it headlong like a fool?  I went into it like a wise 
man and that was just my destruction.  And you mustn’t suppose that I didn’t know, for 
instance, that if I began to question myself whether I had the right to gain power – I 
certainly hadn’t the right – or that if I asked myself whether a human being is a louse it 
proved that it wasn’t so for me, though it might be for a man who would go straight to his 
goal without asking questions. . . .  If I worried myself all those days, wondering whether 
Napoleon would have done it or not, I felt clearly of course that I wasn’t Napoleon.  I had 
to endure all the agony of that battle of ideas . . . and I longed to throw it off: I wanted to 
murder without causitry, to murder for my own sake, for myself alone! . . . I wanted to 
find out quickly whether I was a louse like everybody else or a man.  Whether I can step 
over barriers or not, whether I dare stoop to pick up or not, whether I am a trembling 
creature or whether I have the right. . . . ”
171
   
 
The acknowledgment of the truth that “I wasn’t Napoleon” leads Raskolnikov into the 
following realization, which expresses that the haughtiness of his actions equates to a 
demonic intoxication bearing consequences for him personally: 
“. . . I want to prove one thing only, that the devil led me on and then he has shown me 
since that I had not the right to take that path, because I am just such a louse as all the 
rest. . . . Did I murder the old woman?  I murdered myself, not her!  I crushed myself 




Sonia provides Raskolnikov with the strength to atone for his crime and to consequently 
regenerate his psyche.  Sonia’s philosophy is one of persistent humility: “but I can’t 
know the Divine Providence,” and the acceptance of suffering and deference to God: 
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“how could it happen that it should depend on my decision – who has made me a judge to 
decide who is to live and who is not to live?”
173
  It serves as the counterpoint in this novel 
from which Raskolnikov is ultimately able to accept the consequences of his actions.  
Raskolnikov asks Sonia, “what am I to do now?” to whom Sonia replies with the 
Christian argument: “Suffer and expiate your sin by it, that’s what you must do.”
174
  
From Sonia the Christian idea of repentance, and its applicability to political 
circumstances, can be illuminated.  The idea of repentance as a conscious admittance of 
one’s crime is related to the notion of spiritual therapy; the locus of spiritual regeneration 
is as well a conscious devise.  Sonia is immediately aware of the nature of the falsehood 
into which Raskolnikov has delved: “You have turned away from God and God has 
smitten you, has given you over to the devil!”
175
   But she also knows that atonement is 
achieved through the conscious rejection of the ideas which had festered within a 
metaphysical rebel.  Just as he “turned away from God,” the act of repentance is achieved 
by simply turning towards God; it is the Platonic periagoge.   
 This turn is facilitated through Sonia’s unqualified love for Raskolnikov: “He had 
gone to her, Sonia, first with his confession; he had gone to her for human fellowship 
when he needed it; she would go with him wherever fate might send him.”
176
  She could 
forgive any crime, and Raskolnikov’s realization of this fact ties him to the more difficult 
truth consistent with Dostoevsky’s “lofty suffering:”  “He looked at Sonia and felt how 
great was her love for him, and strange to say he felt it suddenly burdensome and painful 
                                                
173
 Ibid. pg. 403 
174
 Ibid. pgs. 415-416 
175
 Ibid. pg. 413 
176
 Ibid. pg. 516 
 75
to be so loved.”
177
  The significance of Sonia to Raskolnikov is the vouchsafing of the 
notion that Christian truth, representative in the character of Sonia, is not begrudging but 
open to humanity despite the radical nature of humanity’s errors.  Because of the depth of 
Sonia’s love for Raskolnikov  or of Christ’s love for man  Raskolnikov’s crime 
affected Sonia as man’s sin affected Christ.  Sonia declares to Raskolnikov: “We will go 
to suffer together, and together we will bear our cross!”
178
   
 The acceptance of such a truth is facilitated by, as much as it facilitates, the 
dismissal of haughty and domineering worldly desires.  It is, however, a conscious and 
deliberative acceptance: Raskolnikov had to bring it upon himself to confess to Sonia, to 
the town-square, and to the police.  Although atonement in Siberia will certainly bring 
with it suffering, such suffering is validated by a particular sort of responsibility 
motivated by the ineradicable discovery of love.  Zametov expresses that responsibility 
and its impetus appositely near the novel’s close: “Official duty is one thing but . . . you 
are thinking I meant to say friendship is quite another?  No, you are wrong!  It’s not 
friendship, but the feeling of a man and a citizen, the feeling of humanity and of love for 
the Almighty.”
179
  Zametov is saying, in other words, that this responsibility cannot be 
brought about by society or politics, but only through a personal attunement to the 
transcendent ground.  
Ivan’s experience also affirms the remedial response to metaphysical rebellion, 
and exposes similar regenerative capabilities to be inherent to gnostic thinker as well as 
to ideological rabble.  Voegelin argues that the fall into metaphysical rebellion is a 
“general human problem,” and insinuates that the recovery from the fall has general 
                                                
177
 Ibid. pg. 417 
178
 Ibid. pg. 418 
179




  Dostoevsky affirms this argument; although Ivan’s lesson is 
harsh, the reader is not left with the impression that it is an inevitable fate.  Dimitri 
prophesizes in the epilogue: “Listen, our brother Ivan will surpass everyone.  He ought to 
live and not us.  He will recover.”
181
   
Ivan’s brother Dimitri illustrates that even the most vile and tyrannical can find 
hope in the salvation from their disposition.  Mitya is a slovenly character, predisposed to 
immanent fulfillment; transcendent happiness is initially too difficult an attunement for 
him.  In his words:  
“. . . man is broad, too broad, indeed.  I’d have him narrower.  The devil only knows what 
to make of it!  What to the mind is shameful is beauty and nothing else to the heart.  Is 
there beauty in Sodom?  Believe me, that for the immense mass of mankind beauty is 
found in Sodom.  Did you know that secret?  The awful thing is that beauty is mysterious 




   
The characters of Mitya and Alyosha are juxtaposing representations.  Alyosha’s angelic 
qualities are offset by Mitya’s inebriated escapades.  Sandoz has called them “the twin 
abysses of the Karamazov character.”
183
  Ivan represents a more typically representative 
human being in flux between the antipodal embodiments of his brothers.  Hence, when 
Mitya later realizes God’s purpose in the battle, it is an all the more poignant reminder of 
the hope inherent in God’s world for all men, with indifference to their former disposition 
concerning the world: 
“Even there, in the mines, underground, I may find a human heart in another convict and 
murderer by my side, and I may make friends with him, for even there one may live and 
love and suffer.  One may resurrect and revive a frozen heart in that convict, one may 
wait upon him for years, and at last bring up from the dark depths a lofty soul, a feeling, 
suffering creature; one may bring forth an angel, resurrect a hero!  There are so many of 
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them, and we are all responsible for them.  It’s for the babe I’m going.  Because we are 
all responsible for all.  I go for all because someone must go for all.  I didn’t kill father, 
but I’ve got to go, I accept it.  Oh yes, we shall be in chains and there will be no freedom, 
but then, in our great sorrow, we shall rise again to joy, without which men cannot live 




The atonement process, evident in Mitya as a conscious acceptance of the egregiousness 
of his past, can serve a remedial or regenerative function, as acknowledged by 
Konstankin Mochulsky: “[Mitya] has to pass through the purification of suffering, 
through the torment of conscience and the spiritual death of penal servitude in order that 
the flame of Eros, which has caught fire in him might become a spiritual force that 
transfigures the world.”
185
   
VI 
 The purification process brought Mitya through both spiritual anguish and 
physical suffering.  Raskolnikov’s experience in the town square also illustrated that the 
turn towards eternal truth can be immanently problematic.  Raskolnikov was forced not 
only to atone for his crime in Siberia, but to confess awkwardly to the gawking 
townspeople: “I am a murderer.”
186
  Turning from untruth can require strength in the face 
of worldly despair and for men to alienate themselves from society.  Dostoevsky gives us 
literary evidence of the awkward recovery from metaphysical rebellion, and the impetus 
for such action, in the example of the antihero in Notes from Underground. 
 The antihero is angry, vindictive and rebellious.  He introduces himself by 
indicating that he is indeed angry, “sick,” and refuses “treatment out of spite.”
187
  The 
treatment he refuses, materialistic socialism, is the social status quo of his day.  It is not 
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that the antihero had not wished to become a good socialist, an ardent soldier in the wave 
of change and empowerment; he had earnestly sought to construct these “intellectual” 
designs but found himself incapable:  “I couldn’t make myself anything: neither good nor 
bad, neither a scoundrel nor an honest man, neither a hero nor an insect.”
188
  But the 
realization of the logical end of the nihilistic construction, that what is evil must be 
accepted as zealously as what is good, inspires a disaffection towards such designs: “Now 
I go on living in my corner and irritating myself with the spiteful and worthless 
consolation that a wise man can’t seriously make himself anything, only a fool makes 
himself anything.”
189
   The philosophy based on the understanding that “I couldn’t even 
make an insect out of myself”
190
 reveals the bitter psychological process of rebelling 
against socially dominant but impracticable ideology, culminating in the rewarding 
process of realizing the more “difficult truth.” 
 The rebellion of the antihero is an active process against those who are 
themselves metaphysical rebels.  This is a fundamental and necessary aspect of political 
rebellion; it manifests as a counteractive response to a socially proliferate metaphysical 
rebellion.  Stated simply, a political rebel requires a tyrannical encroachment to rebel 
against.  Because the metaphysical rebellion is socially proliferate, and although the 
antihero becomes attuned to the transcendent ground of truth, he makes arguments 
against accepted or perceived truths such as the laws of nature and of mathematics as 
coined by socialist man.  Inherent to the socialist system against which the antihero rebels 
is the insistence upon conjectured “laws of nature” and “of mathematics” that he cannot 
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  This insistence upon conjecturing has been exemplified as “intellectual 
swindle” in Voegelin’s critique of Marx.  It is the act of proclaiming, for the sake of a 
particular goal, the laws of nature that are designed to appear as in accord with the 
desired goal of a gnostic system.   
 The antihero understands the design of materialistic socialism to be the creation of 
a new type of man that juxtaposes “the real man.”
192
  This “test-tube man” is designed to 
“make something” of the world: 
 “A man like that goes straight for his goal like a mad bull charging his horns down, and 
is to be stopped, if at all, by a stone wall. . . . men like that, men of action, doers, quite 
genuinely give up when faced with a wall; to them a wall is not a challenge, as it is to us, 
for example, men who think and therefore don’t do anything; nor is it an excuse for 
tuning aside, an excuse that people like us are always glad of, even if we don’t usually 




If we understand “action” to be the attempt to create facts, and “thinkers” as devoted to 
empirical evidence, then the antihero’s division between action and thought distinguishes 
the “test-tube man” as gnostic.  The gnosticism of test-tube man is made apparent by his 
devotion to the stone wall of “the laws of nature and of mathematics,” endowed “by way 
of the strictest logical syllogisms.”
194
  The antihero is being sarcastic when implying that 
such logic can deliver man into truths that are not evident without the insight provided by 
the logic of the gnostic: 
“What do I mean by a stone wall?  Well, of course, the laws of nature or the conclusions 
of the natural sciences or of mathematics.  When it is proved, for example, that you are 
descended from an ape, it’s no use scowling about it – accept it as a fact.  Or if it is 
demonstrated that half an ounce of your own fat ought to be essentially dearer to you than 
a hundred thousand of your fellow-creatures, and that this demonstration finally disposes 
of all so-called good deeds, duties, and other lunacies and prejudices, simply accept it; 
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The laws of nature and of mathematics in this case symbolize the result of gnostic 
speculation.  They are not representative of God’s laws of nature and of mathematics.  In 
other words, they represent an attempt to manufacture facts.  Yet because facts are 
grounded in preexistent empirical evidence, the laws against which he rebels are not 
God’s but an imposter’s.  The bounds of the possible are established by the divine and 
any attempt by man to establish his own bounds will result in a situation in which a 
“stone wall” is constructed by that man for the defense of his construction.  The stone 
wall is representative of the “the prohibition of questions,” as it shelters the construction 
from the preexisting reality.  Through the obfuscation of first reality, and the attempt to 
replace it with a second reality of manufactured facts, the system for deriving these facts 
reveals itself to be gnostic speculation.  
 Duplicity reveals the gnosticism of a system.  Although other aspects of 
gnosticism are detectable, such as dissatisfaction and the dream of a better life, not all 
gnostic traits are exclusive to metaphysical rebellion.  In metaphysical rebellion, 
dissatisfaction must result in an attempt to transfigure the essence of being – to change 
what man fundamentally is – which includes the mysterious dictates of man’s conscience.   
For example, in The Notes the social system relies upon the underlying motivation of 
disaffection, “this well established and yet somehow unconvincing powerlessness to 
escape from the situation.”
196
  Yet distinguished from the dissatisfaction of the political 
rebel, metaphysical rebellion drives man to attempt an escape from the world while 
overlooking the moral bounds to action.  It seeks a transfiguration whose impracticability 
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is mysterious but catalyzed by an uneasy feeling with the abnegation of morals.  The 
antihero, in his attempt at metaphysical rebellion, feels this uneasiness.  Thus in this 
attempt the antihero realizes that such bounds are indeed ineradicable:  
“. . . I would be deeply moved, filled with remorse, and shedding tears, and, of course, I 
was deceiving myself, although I wasn’t consciously pretending.  My heart seemed to 
purge itself of its own accord. . . . For this I couldn’t even blame the laws of nature . . . 
the whole thing was a lie, a disgusting lie, an unnatural lie. . . . Do you ask why I tortured 
and tormented myself?  The answer is that it was too boring to sit and do nothing, so I 
indulged my fantasy.”
197
   
 
The antihero’s realization that the system was a lie and that his motive was fantasy is 
spawned from a conscionable conflict between the proposition made and the mysterious 
realm of being which moved him into conflict with it.  The conflict did not arise from 
another purported claim, but from emotions and thoughts developed by the antihero in the 
process of living his daily life.  The conflict is between a claim and an experience, 
between conjecture and evidence. 
 This duplicity, and its experiential consequence, is symbolized by the Palace of 
Crystal.  It is a symbol which expresses frustration at and augments the conflict between 
fantasy and life.  The Palace of Crystal is a mechanism for lying; it is a structure “at 
which one couldn’t furtively put out one’s tongue or make concealed gestures of 
derision . . . it will not be possible even to put out one’s tongue at [it] in secret.”
198
  The 
inability to question the Palace reveals the disingenuousness of it to the antihero: “I still 
refuse to take a henhouse for a palace.  Let us grant that a building of crystal is a castle in 
the air, that by the laws of nature it is a sheer impossibility, and that I have invented it out 
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of nothing but my own stupidity and certain antiquated irrational habits of my 
generation.”
199
   
 The antihero’s clear frustration, even bitterness towards the system is facilitated 
by its negation of the antihero’s conscience; the force which moves him to abjure the 
“sheer impossibility” of it.  The antihero admits: “I am certain that underground people 
like me must be kept in check . . . if we do come into the world and burst out, we will talk 
and talk and talk. . . .”
200
  The system is gnostic speculation not because it is inspired by 
dissatisfaction or because it inspires people to dream and to fantasize, but because it 
resides on the submission of those in the underground.  If they were to talk and talk, it 
would become evident that half of an ounce of a man’s own fat is, in contradiction to all 
that the system proclaims, worth little to nothing next to the whole of humanity. 
 The antihero is angry, vindictive and rebellious because such a reality forces him 
into a situation in which his conscience finds no solace.  Konstantin Mochulsky argues: 
“Consciousness opposes itself to the world.  It is alone, against it is everything.”
201
  The 
insurmountable hopelessness of rebelling against the Palace of Crystal delivers the 
antihero into a paradox.  The suffering inherent to his rebellion must be experienced if he 
is to attune himself to that which his soul experiences to be real.  Mochulsky writes of the 
antihero: 
 “The underground man’s paradoxes are not the whims of some half-mad eccentric, but a 
new revelation of man about man.  The consciousness of the angry mouse, crushed in the 
underground, proves to be human consciousness in general.  We are hitting upon the 
enigma of consciousness.  A man becomes a man if he possesses consciousness.  Without 
consciousness, man is an animal.  But consciousness arises only out of conflict with 
reality, from a breach with the world.  Consciousness must pass through isolation and 
solitude; it is pain.  On the other hand – solitary consciousness does not exist; it is always 




 Ibid. pg. 43 
201
 Mochulsky, Dostoevsky, pg. 248 
 83
joined with all mankind, it is organically collective.  In this tormenting contradiction is 
the tragedy of personality.”
202
   
 
The discovery of consciousness is, for the antihero, the discovery of an individual 
responsibility for his actions that conflicts against his experience in the world.  But 
because such a responsibility defines man, elevating him above the beasts, the pain 
inherent to the conflict becomes justified.  
 The antihero’s experiences, told in The Story of the Falling Sleet, lead the reader 
into an understanding of a conception of happiness which validates immanent suffering.  
Consciousness does not find its impetus in materialistic or worldly experiences but in the 
way in which such experiences are experienced.  An experience lacking consciousness is 
informed solely by materialistic desires.  In an attempt to reconcile his station with his 
worldly desires, the antihero subjects himself to various awkward situations that attempt 
such a reconciliation.  He always finds himself stepping aside for a particular officer on 
the street.  Wishing to be more socially significant, his rebellion manifests as a rejection 
of society’s status quo, one day thinking to himself: “What . . . if I were to meet him 
and . . . not step aside?”
203
  Unable to stand his ground, however, the antihero’s 
inadequacy festers into an impetus for action.  He constructs a dream-world for himself in 
which he can envision his situation becoming transfigured:  
“But I had one resource that reconciled all these contradictions – escaping into ‘all that is 
best and highest,’ in my dreams, of course.  I dreamed endlessly.  I dreamed for three 
months, crouching in my corner, and you may rest assured that during those moments 




The dream-world construction prompts the antihero to proliferate the conflict between 
fantasy and reality by trying to befriend a group of officers.  At this point, the antihero is 
                                                
202
 Ibid. pgs. 245 - 246 
203
 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, pg. 56 
204
 Ibid. pg. 58 
 84
acting as a hero, as a man capable of transfiguring reality; his design for acknowledgment 
is one bent on social acceptance and materialistic success.  But armed with a new 
decorous wardrobe, the antihero remains unable to win the friendship of the officers.  
Finding himself to be an impotent hero, the antihero’s actions decline into an attempt to 
merely destruct the society as it were:  
“They are not going to kneel before me begging for my friendship.  That’s a mirage, a 
vulgar illusion, disgusting, romantic, and fanciful. . . .  And that’s why I must give 
Zverkov a slap in the face!  I’m obliged to it.  So it’s settled.  I’m in a tearing hurry to 




But the slap is not delivered.  The antihero fails to find Zverkov, instead 
becoming distracted by a girl named Liza.  This distraction will lead him to abandon his 
quest for worldly conquest by attuning him to a different conception of value and truth 
grounded in personal, not social, fulfillment: 
“I suspect, gentleman, that you are sorry for me; you keep telling me that an enlightened 
and fully developed human being of the future, cannot knowingly will something that is 
bad for him, and that this is mathematics.  I quite agree, it really is a mathematical 
certainty.  But I repeat for the hundredth time that there is one case, and only one, when a 
man can consciously and purposely desire for himself what is positively harmful and 
stupid, even the very height of stupidity, and that is when he claims the right to desire 





The right to attune oneself to a truth beyond sensory perceptions grounds the antihero’s 
disposition as a rejection of worldly goods for a higher, eternal truth experienced through 
a consciousness that disregards one’s worldly situation. 
 The antihero’s consciousness can be symbolized as an attunement to God.  The 
consequences of this discovery are explained in St. John’s first epistle: “God is love; and 
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he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him.”
207
  The antihero’s 
conversation with Liza reveals that his apparently bitter and antagonistic rebellion is not 
actually grounded in the deconstruction of reality, but in the reorientation of the way in 
which reality is perceived.  One attuned to God experiences life in a particular manner  
as informed by love.  This position directly contradicts the deconstruction attempted in 
the antihero’s former position as hero.  As hero the antihero was attuned to the 
improvement of his station in the world, or to a calculation for social acceptance and 
material well being.  He was involved in a quest for mundane satiety, which is irrelevant 
to a man filled with love. The antihero’s rebellion against society – his descent into the 
underground – is therefore not an attempt to transfigure materialistic conditions but to 
ignore or to transcend them.  He tells Liza: “And when there is love, you can live even 
without happiness.  Life is good even in sorrow; it is good to live in the world, however 
you live.”
208
  The following exchange between the two buttresses the idea: 
“‘Some people are glad to sell their daughters instead of giving them in marriage 
honestly,’ she said suddenly. 
Ah!  So that’s it! 
‘That’s in those accursed families where there is neither God nor love, Liza,’ I said hotly, 
‘and where there is no love, there is no reason either.  There are such families, certainly, 
but I am not talking about them.  It is clear you never knew the kindness in your family, 
if you say things like that.  You are truly unfortunate.  H’m . . . It is mostly poverty that 
does that.’ 
‘Is it any better among gentlefolk then?  And decent people lead good lives even if they 
are poor.’ 
‘H’m . . . yes.  Perhaps.  There’s another thing, Liza: people only like to count their 
sorrows, they don’t count their happinesses.  But if they reckoned as they ought to, they 
would see that everybody gets his share of everything.  Well, but suppose everything 
goes well for your family, God is good to you, your husband proves to be a good man 
who loves you and cherishes you and doesn’t leave you!  It would be happy in a family 
like that.”
209
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Through the experience of love, the troubles of worldly circumstances fade away and 
happiness is found through responsibility directed towards oneself and those one loves: 
“Why, if a husband is a good and honest man, and gets on in life, how can love pass away?  
The first wedded love passes, true, but then comes an even better love.  The two come 
together in soul and have all things in common; they have no secrets from one another.  
And when children come, even the most difficult of times will seem happiness; one need 




The antihero’s focus in these thoughts is not towards immanent matters.  Poverty, he 
implies, can be tolerated if one has love.  Tyrannical action defined as the attempt to 
enforce one’s will upon others, which was the essential position of the hero, cannot be 
identified with the antihero’s newfound position.  He admits of himself as hero that 
“without power and tyranny over somebody I can’t live,”
211
 and that “with me to love 
meant to tyrannize.”
212
  But these admissions come in the process of realizing that such a 
disposition construes the essence of man because it is epistemologically restrictive.  
Therefore, the ludicrous activities of the hero must be understood as the activities of the 
antihero while in the process of discovering that he could “make” nothing of himself, that 
his erroneous judgment was indeed the consequence of having been incorrect about the 
nature of reality.   
VII 
 The turn from hero to antihero expresses fundamental attributes shared between 
the metaphysical and the political rebel.  Both the hero and the antihero express 
dissatisfaction towards their situation.  Dissatisfaction is the inherent motivator of all 
rebellions.  The reasons that hero and antihero were dissatisfied, however, reveal a 
fundamental distinction between the attributes of the two positions.  The hero was 
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dissatisfied with the capabilities of natural human beings and sought to generate from 
them a superior being in the form of test-tube man.  Contrarily, the antihero was 
dissatisfied because the attempt to create a new and superior test-tube man was 
discovered to be fallacious: “. . . I couldn’t even make an insect of myself.”
213
  The hero 
sought to transfigure reality, whereas the antihero sought happiness within the confines of 
the traditional natural man, transfiguring man’s conception of happiness instead of the 
material world in which he lives. 
 Implicit to this observation is the ostensible appearance of dream-world 
constructions within both forms of rebellion.  Because both hero and antihero dream of a 
transfigured situation, it might seem that both therefore create a second-reality which 
prompts their aspirations.  The construction of a dream-world, however, which operates 
in active conflict against the world experienced is inherent to metaphysical rebellion only.  
Again, the distinction between an ontological ground (an attempt to transfigure reality) 
and an epistemological ground (or an attempt to transfigure conceptualizations) is the 
element which differentiates the two forms of rebellion.  The political rebel  though he 
dreams of a better way of life  does not dream of a new world or reality that would be a 
necessary prerequisite for the achievement of his dream.  Hence the goals of the hero and 
antihero are perversions of one another.  The hero dreams of a new man which can 
facilitate happiness as he conceives of it.  He requires a new man and a new form of 
being  a new world or a new reality.  The antihero transfigures his idea of happiness, 
accepting the man to be concrete.  He merely requires a new way of thinking, or of 
looking at the world.  Both hero and antihero therefore operate within conflict, in 
antagonism against a world which precludes his ideas.  The distinction between antihero 
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and hero, however, lies in the willingness of the antihero to abandon the fallacy of 
attempting to transfigure reality.   
 The antihero is so labeled because he is lethargic in his rebellion: “. . . it is best to 
do nothing!  The best thing is conscious inertia!  So long live the underground!”
214
  The 
underground is not, however, the manifestation of his rebellion but the mere impetus of it.  
The underground only opens the door for the discovery of love: “. . . it isn’t the 
underground that is better, but something different, entirely different, which I am eager 
for, but which I shall never find.  Devil take the underground!”
215
  The antihero is aware 
that to transform the underground into a Palace of Crystal would be to vitiate the 
discovery made in the therein.  It is not the underground itself, but the ability to love 
which it facilitates that drives his rebellion.  He is aware that no political system can ever 
eradicate man’s conscience.   
The foundation of man’s being as in his soul is the persistent and desperate plea 
of the mature Dostoevsky, and a common theme threading the works examined above.  
The hero abandons his dream-world for the antihero’s dream of love.  Raskolnikov turns 
from his crime and finds his atonement through Sonia in Siberia.  Mitya finds God 
through suffering, and Ivan’s insanity reveals him to be “that hero of honor and 
conscience” because, unlike the Inquisitor he dreamt of, his madness was the culmination 
of a philosophical stupor his psyche could not ultimately endure.
216
  His brothers and 
Katerina Ivanovna hope for his recovery.  They expect it, indeed, for as much as 
Dostoevsky prophesies the spiritual and political horrors to come in Russia he also 
foresees the ability to escape from such horrors.  The ability to recover from spiritual 
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degradation through the discovery of one’s soul, and being fulfilled by the pangs suffered 
through it, is the bittersweet yet triumphant and final assertion of Fyodor Dostoevsky, 
grounded in Ellis Sandoz’s observation that “man is what he is. . . .”
217
   
 This reconciliation with reality remains melancholy because it catalyzes 
immanent suffering.  In Plato’s cave, one who rises will be killed if he returns for his 
brethren.  Dostoevsky gives us solid literary evidence that the impetus of such brave yet 
apparently futile action begins in the hearts of individual men.  Christ, for example, 
forgives the Inquisitor with a kiss before being dismissed “into the dark squares of the 
town.”
218
  But what does happen in those dark squares?  How does the individual 
rejection of an oppressive untruth disseminate through a society cloaked in darkness?  
Answers to these questions turn us from the literary evidence provided by Dostoevsky, 
towards the historical example of the Velvet Revolution.   
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Chapter Two: Václav Havel 
 Dostoevsky’s work explored a decisive rift between two potential motivating 
factors; pitting the good of mundane satiety against that of man’s consciousness.  The 
paradox is that man and world are wrapped into the same game: man lives in the world, 
yet the good of his consciousness juxtaposes what the world may imply to be good.  The 
inherent danger is of falling for the appeal of mundane satiety, and of organizing political 
affairs accordingly.  Yet Dostoevsky’s dark novels are augmented by the faint hope that 
the bleak society he foresees through the Inquisitor is not the end of history and 
progressive men.  Rather, such societies possess the capability of recognizing the untruth 
which had procreated their systems, and can discover the truth of consciousness if it is 
only made evident to them.  Gnostic systems reside on ideological rabbles or “obedient 
flocks” for their furtherance, cozening them into believing false propositions to be true.   
Nonetheless the ineffable but undeniable truth of consciousness has the power to override 
the deception and turn a rabble from a gnostic untruth towards the truth informed by 
man’s consciousness. 
I 
Support for this argument can be found in the historical example of the Velvet 
Revolution in Czechoslovakia, the culmination of which resulted in the election of 
Václav Havel as the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic on December 29, 1989.  
Although at first glance the election appears serendipitous – Havel had been a playwright 
whose works were banned under the former regime – it is more the result of, as he puts it, 
“living in the truth.”  The idea is a correlate of Voegelin’s theory of consciousness – of 
attuning oneself to “the desire to know.”  In Science, Politics, and Gnosticism Voegelin 
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identifies this act as “therapeutic analysis.”  The Velvet Revolution is a prime example of 
the regenerative effects of this process upon society, and the political philosophy derived 
from the essays and speeches of Havel identify the movement as rooted in an individual 
awareness of personal identity and responsibility.  Moreover, his writings reveal his 
motives to be against the communist Czech regime for its encroachment against this 
responsibility and personality; they therefore reveal that the case is an example of 
political rebellion. Thus thru an analysis of Havel and the Velvet Revolution empirical 
evidence is given to support the thesis that political rebellions, or rebellions waged 
against oppressive regimes, are driven by individuals’ consciousnesses as informed by 
noetic reason.      
 As for Dostoevsky, the personal experiences of Havel are imperative to his 
thought.  Yet the decisive philosophical rift that occurred in Dostoevsky – the turn from 
fallacy towards truth – is wanting in Havel.  An examination of Havel therefore does not 
replicate but compliments the Dostoevsky analysis.  Where Dostoevsky reveals the 
untruth of gnostic systemization and that turning from it can be remedial, Havel focuses 
upon the impetus and effects of the turn.  Havel illustrates the consequence of adhering to 
the newfound truth; how by simply living within the truth it may permeate throughout a 
society, and how this permeation may reshape the human experience for the better. 
 Having lived under the auspices of eight forms of totalitarian governance, from 
Nazi occupation to Stalinism to Czechoslovakia’s ‘post-totalitarian regime,’ Havel 
possessed a predilection for their infringements upon his sense of self.
219
  His 
philosophical and literary tastes illustrate this point.  Edá Kriseová argues that Franz 
Kafka is his foremost influence.  She writes:  
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“Kafka and Havel have in common their recognition of the absurd dimension of the 
world, their experience of exile, of shyness, of persistent doubt in themselves and their 
abilities, and a sense of guilt and of their own particular obscurity. . . .   Both are 
interested in the loss of an individual’s identity, in a person’s position as the victim and 
target of manipulation by an impersonal power.”
220
   
 
This persistent sense of alienation against the world fortified Havel’s philosophical quest 
for identity.  At an address at Hebrew University, Jerusalem in 1990, Havel affirmed his 
affinity for Kafka, saying: “if Kafka had not lived, and if I could write a little better than I 
can, I would have written his complete works myself.”
221
   He goes on to explain exactly 
what this implies: 
“I shall try to give a very brief, telegraphic description of the more easily described 
aspects of this experience.  These are: a deep, basic and thus thoroughly undefined sense 
of personal guilt.  As if it were my very existence that were a sin.  Then there is the 
strong sense of both my not belonging and of the inappropriateness of everything that 
contributes to these feelings.  An oppressive sense of unbearable claustrophobia, a 
constant need to explain and defend myself before someone.  A longing for an 
unattainable order of things, a longing that grows stronger as the ground on which I stand 
becomes more unpredictable and indecipherable.  Sometimes I feel the need to reaffirm 
my problematic identity by shouting at someone, by standing up for my rights.  This 
shout is of course completely futile, the reply never finds the right audience, but vanishes 
into the black hole that surrounds me.  Everything that I experience reveals to me first 
and foremost its absurdity.  As if I were running after a group of strong, confident men 
whom I can never overtake or match.  I am basically an aggravating person, and I feel 




Havel’s description of himself, for its sense of worthlessness and absurdity, reminds of 
Dostoevsky’s antihero and of his underground.  Havel, however, leaves a more hopeful 
political suggestion than had the antihero.  Where Dostoevsky leaves off at the 
reconciliation of man with his consciousness, Havel begins at this point to arrive at the 
political ramifications of this resolution.      
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As consciousness and personal experience are dependent upon one another, 
Havel’s philosophy of dissent is grounded in the experiences of his life that led him from 
being an outlawed playwright to a political superstar.  As signatory and spokesman for 
Charter 77, his philosophical journey was transfigured into a political plight.  
Reminiscent of America’s Declaration of Independence, the Charter’s declaration, dated 
January 1, 1977, reads that “Charter 77 is a free, informal, and open community of people 
of different convictions, different faiths, and different professions, united by the will to 
strive, individually and collectively, for the respect of civic and human rights.”
223
  The 
charter represents the institutional manifestation of political rebellion; it is a provision for 
the ascertainment of individual authenticity; it symbolizes the institutional embodiment 
of an attunement to consciousness.  This chapter’s purpose is to illustrate the ways in 
which it was brought about, and why it was designed as it were. 
The experiences surrounding this achievement are infused throughout this chapter, 
as they shaped the metamorphosis from individual responsibility to political action.  They 
argue that the provision of a community of free-thinking individuals therefore supplies 
the theoretical underpinning for “therapeutic analysis,” but also that “therapeutic analysis 
underlies the establishment of such a community.  This chapter seeks to illustrate Havel’s 
resolution to this paradox, by showing how the dissemination of the belief in freedom 
proved a catalyst for the liberation of Czechoslovakia itself; the Charter culminated in a 
peaceful revolution in November, 1989, thrusting Havel into the presidency of a fledgling 
democratic regime.      
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II 
Havel’s theory of consciousness is remarkably similar to Voegelin’s.  But where 
Havel departs from, and perhaps may strengthen the arguments inherent to Voegelin’s 
theory, is in his application of consciousness to political action and organization.  
Voegelin certainly implies this applicability, yet Havel’s work deepens Voegelin’s by 
formulating a coherent theory on the progression from conscious realization to political 
action.  Hence, from Havel’s assessment we can see both political rebellion and the 
ramifications of it; a process involving both individual rebellious spirits and a collective 
revolutionary movement culminating in the institution of an open and free form of 
government consistent with the Lockean social contract.     
Voegelin’s anthropological principle, founded on the Platonic insight that  as 
Voegelin frames it  “the polis is man written in larger letters,” insinuates that the 
remedy for totalitarian governance is not to be found through a socialized prescription for 
happiness.
224
  Voegelin argues that Plato “restrains himself deliberately . . . in order not 
to give the false impression that good order in a polis can be created through institutional 
devices.”
225
  If man’s essence can be correlated to his consciousness, then Plato’s dictum 
implies that the ground of social stability is as well grounded therein.  Thus political 
institutions which allow for an attunement to consciousness are the most fulfilling; not 
because of any particular institutional design, but because good men make government 
function fairly and without usurpations.  Voegelin does not go much further than this 
observation, although its implications for the character of institutions appear from time to 
time in his writings.  He concludes The New Science of Politics, for example, with the 
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reflection that the American and English institutions are the most appropriate for man, as 
those forms most accurately reflect the truth of the soul.
226
  But this constitutes one short 
paragraph, and does not speak to the process of instituting such forms.  In so far as we are 
concerned not only with the rebellion against tyranny or totalitarianism but also with the 
reorganization of society after that rebellion, we cannot rely independently on Voegelin’s 
theory of consciousness.   
Havel too begins with the anthropological principle, writing that “. . . all attempts 
by society to resist the pressure of the system have their essential beginnings in the pre-
political area.”
227
   Yet he applies its implications to the process of rebellion and political 
change in a way that compliments Voegelin’s insights.  He would agree with the 
argument that institutions themselves do not provide a nostrum from which humanity 
may flourish; he writes: “. . . a better system will not automatically ensure a better 
life.”
228
  The construction of institutional systems does not address the nature of the 
psyches of the men who must function within them.  Instead of focusing upon the 
institutions, Havel argues that an appropriate method of counter-systemization resides in 
the human beings underlying the institutions.  He writes that “such a change will have to 
derive from human existence, from the fundamental reconstitution of the position of 
people in the world, their relationships to themselves and to each other, and to the 
universe.”
229
  Such an idea therefore rests on the attunement of individuals to the 
pragmatic implications of their behaviors.  Each man has a responsibility to the society in 
which he lives, as it is nothing more than a reflection of the efforts of him and his 
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brethren.  It can only be as good, as productive, as hard-working and as pleasant as the 
men within it.  This principle implies that whatever form of institution might exist: it can 
only be fulfilling and productive if the men within it are good.  Hence a revolution that 
seeks to institute a suitable regime – whatever its form might be  will always seek the 
production of good men first.   
Inculcating a consciousness of what is good for the polis and of a personal 
responsibility for that good is the means by which good men are produced; this is the 
standard around which political action and organization should be oriented.  The process 
of political rebellion begins from the discovery of personal integrity in the face of 
political oppression; its relationship with metaphysical rebellion identifies the ground of 
its impetus as an awareness of the full actuality of one’s condition – in light of worldly 
and transcendent obligations. 
Although it is a reactionary device against the usurpations of metaphysical rebels, 
it appears in some ways similar to the response of the metaphysical rebel to the general 
conditions of the world.  Both processes are prompted by being dissatisfied.  For the 
metaphysical rebel, a grievance is raised against God concerning the order of being; for 
example, in Ivan Karamazov’s case, the grievance was the suffering of innocents.  The 
political rebel, however, is also dissatisfied with his situation.  He only differs from the 
metaphysical rebel on the premise that he does not attribute his grievance to the intrinsic 
organization of the world, but to a sense of injustice against that order.  Thus an 
assessment of a rebel’s condition should be informed by not only the ostensible 
characteristics of it, but the motivating factors behind them.  The, ‘the world is unfair 
because it precludes my utopian fantasies’ must be aggregated from the ‘the world is 
 97
unfair, but an injustice is being done against that world, as unfair as it may at times be.’ 
In the former case, the promise of paradise convinces individuals, in good faith, that the 
order of things had simply been mistaken in the first place.  The metaphysical rebel 
claims that the utopian cause is consistent with the laws of reality and that this promise 
can indeed be procreated from, and as an improvement to, the nature of existence.  
Contrarily, the political rebel understands that this world is not a paradise, yet strives to 
achieve what he feasibly may within it.   It is easy for imperfect men to become 
disoriented and frustrated against the hopes of such competing claims to truth.  It is 
moreover easy for them to therein mistake the foundations of happiness. 
However, it is precisely the disoriented and lost soul that can catalyze the quest 
for orientation.  As exemplified by Dimitri, Ivan, Raskolnikov and the antihero, this 
notion was a central tenet to Dostoevsky’s work.  Havel, too, affirms that the impetus of 
the turn from untruth is often facilitated by the recognition of being in a state of depravity.  
Often times, in order to recognize the nature of that condition, men must experience it for 
themselves firsthand; in his words: “there are times when we must sink to the bottom of 
our misery to understand truth. . . .”
230
  From the nauseating realization that one does not 
know where one is, can come the understanding that one has become lost, and in 
becoming lost, also become miserable.  In Ivan’s case, the realization of his philosophy’s 
untruth proved a confounding insight; it was only his father’s murder that revealed to him 
the fallacy of his thought.  Because he was driven insane by Smerdaykov’s action, he 
realized the impracticability of his ideas; if only for their effects on his conscience.  He 
will recover, but he will do so because his insanity symbolizes a realization of being in 
disorder and the necessity for a change in his perception of reality.   Thus from the sense 
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that something does not seem right, man first comes to understand that things are indeed 
out of order.  But when the source of disorder is a political regime, the uneasy feeling it 
causes can inspire action which can change the world for the better.  Socrates understood 
this: it is what inspired his rebellion against the Athenian order.  Plato tells us it was his 
daimonion which cautioned him; gave him orientation towards reality and consequently 
informed him of the disorder in his experiential world.
231
  This “inner voice,” as Harry 
Järv puts its, “is simply a question of what we now call conscience.”
232
   
 Havel identifies an attunement to conscience as the first step towards “living 
within the truth.”  Living within the truth is the progression from conscious realization 
towards political action, aimed at the correlation of man’s consciousness with the larger 
social order within which it must interact.  Havel defines “living within the truth” as 
follows: “Living within the truth, as humanity’s revolt against an enforced position is . . . 
an attempt to regain control over one’s own sense of responsibility.”
233
  It is a revolt 
against an enforced position, not an arbitrary reaction to the given circumstances of 
existence.  By this definition an attempt to live within the truth is necessarily a political 
rebellion.  It is an attempt to “regain something” from an “enforced position,” and 
rebellion can only be considered political if there is a tyrannical encroachment against 
which one may stake one’s grievance.  If there are no imposed constraints on reality, if, 
for example, there is no law prescribing suffering, then the rebellion against suffering 
cannot reasonably be executed against a political malefactor.  In avenging a grievance for 
which no one is guilty, men become criminals.  The effects of becoming so, as 
Raskolnikov’s guilty conscience illustrated, means that being conscious of guilt and 
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innocence  being aware of truth  is the initial movement towards actually living within 
the truth.       
Thus living within the truth addresses an enforced position by attuning men to the 
dictates of consciousness.  It is a direct attempt to address the personal and pre-political 
roots of political order.  Havel writes: “Initially, this confrontation does not take place on 
the level of real, institutionalized, quantifiable power which relies on the various 
instruments of power, but on a different level altogether: the level of human 
consciousness and conscience, the existential level.”
234
  Consciousness and conscience 
rely on an understanding that every man can derive from his own personal circumstance.  
The experience of the everyday, in turn, is more powerful than speculative political 
designs, however eloquently stated or mathematically perfect, when that experience is 
one of oppression.  In order to develop the workings of consciousness within the 
attunement to conscience, and the role of this attunement within political rebellion, Havel 
provides the example of the greengrocer.   
Take a grocer who places in his display the banner: ‘Workers of the world, unite!’  
Posting the peculiar sign is explained: “it has been done that way for years, because 
everyone does it, and because that is the way it has to be.  If he were to refuse, there 
could be trouble.”
235
  The sign is stating the greengrocer’s obedience and submissiveness 
to the system.  The truth of the sign is hidden by the grocer’s obsequiousness to the 
enforcement made upon him, it might have read: “‘I am afraid and therefore 
unquestioningly obedient.’”
236
  What the sign actually says is hiding the truth of what the 
sign means.  To become aware of his submissiveness means to imply consequences for 
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the greengrocer.  If he is to remain true to his awareness, his actions must become 
redirected in a manner consistent with his interpretation of the world.  Havel writes:  
 “Let us now imagine that one day something in our greengrocer snaps and he stops 
putting up the slogans merely to ingratiate himself.  He stops voting in elections that he 
knows are a farce.  He begins to say what he really thinks at political meetings.  And he 
even finds the strength in himself to express solidarity with those whom his conscience 
commands him to support.  In this revolt the greengrocer steps out of living within the lie.  
He rejects the ritual and breaks the rules of the game.  He discovers once more his 
suppressed identity and dignity.  He gives his freedom a concrete significance.  His revolt 




The greengrocer example shows that through becoming conscious of a conflict between 
his conscience and reality; the greengrocer reshapes his actions in an attempt to affect 
reality in a way conducive to achieving happiness by establishing a harmony between the 
two entities.  The greengrocer’s revolt is against an enforced position; he can claim 
political grievances.  He is forced to do various things from posting his sign to voting in 
farcical elections.  Although he is not being forced to steal or to murder, the fact that he is 
forced to do these frivolous things compromises his integrity and personal identity.  His 
very personality is stripped from him, and the consequence of this encroachment is an 
autonomy in which that defining part of each of us is obliterated. 
 Returning the Lockean conception of social contract, the purpose of which is 
maintain “lives, liberties . . . and property,” we find the compromise the greengrocer had 
been forced to make a concession of the “liberties” Locke’s conception of government is 
designed to maintain.  “The end of law,” he wrote, “is not to abolish or to restrain, but to 
preserve and enlarge freedom.”
238
  But let us not mistake Locke for an Ivan Karamazov; 
he is not implying an “everything is lawful” philosophy.  In A Letter Concerning 
Toleration he notes that “the sum of all we drive at is that every man may enjoy the same 
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rights that are granted to others.”
239
  He does not argue that all rights should be allowed, 
merely that rights should not be privileged to a few.  Moreover he argues that there is a 
standard of truth for referencing the scale of liberty.  When arguments arise as to which 
rights are to be permissible, and which not, the measure is “God alone.”
240
  Locke argues 
that with God as the measure, consistent with the theories of consciousness discussed in 
this essay, man must tend to his soul “first.” He writes: 
“For there is no judge upon earth between the supreme magistrate and the people.  God, I 
say, is the only judge in this case, who will retribute unto everyone at the last day 
according to his deserts; that is, according to his sincerity and uprightness in 
endeavouring to promote piety, and the public weal and peace of mankind.  But what 
shall be done in the meanwhile?  I answer: The principle and chief care of everyone 
ought to be of his own soul first, and in the next place of the public peace: though yet 




 Thus the greengrocer’s rebellion is validated by the purpose of it.  Aware of an 
imposition upon his integrity by the regime, visa vie the silly sign, his rebellion is 
motivated by an attempt to maintain personal integrity and to care for his “soul first.”  
Only with this qualification in hand, may men begin to consider the methods of achieving 
and maintaining “public peace.”  
III 
  The transmission of the greengrocer’s realization into the society around him lays 
the foundation for political change.  Change is facilitated through what Havel calls “the 
independent spiritual, social and political life of society.”  He writes: 
“. . . its most important focus is marked by a relatively high degree of inner emancipation.  
It sails upon the vast ocean of the manipulated life like little boats, tossed by the waves 
but always bobbing back as visible messengers of living within the truth, articulating the 
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suppressed aims of life . . . it is an area in which living within the truth becomes articulate 




Concretely, it is a relatively nebulous collection of individuals consciously oppressed by 
an enforced way of life.  Such individuals are engaged in “elementary revolts against 
manipulation” including “everything from self-education and thinking about the world, to 
free creative activity and its communication to others, to the most varied free, civic 
attitudes, including instances of independent self-organization.”
243
  The independent life 
of society manifests as sporadic episodes of consciousness no longer to be surmounted by 
an enforced existence, sometimes manifesting as simply not doing something  as in the 
greengrocer’s desire not to post his sign.
244
  These eruptions are the work of dissidents, 
procreated from the independent life of society.
245
   Havel explains the work of dissidents 
as “simply an attempt to create and support the ‘independent life of society’ as an 
articulated expression of living ‘within the truth.’”
246
   
The consequences of political action cannot be overlooked.  Dissidents are thrown 
into a situation, again similar to yet distinct from metaphysical rebellion, in which the 
stakes of the quest become all-or-nothing.  The identification of the rebellion with an all-
or-nothing philosophy is an attribute shared between political and metaphysical rebellions.  
The all-or-nothingness of the metaphysical rebellion is focused around the fulfillment of 
all immanent desires and in the universal – “everyone or no one” – realization of such 
fulfillment.  In the political form, the all-or-nothing mentality likewise becomes evident, 
yet as a risk to the rebel’s existence.  The political rebel will make his world better, or he 
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will cease to live in it.  Because of these stakes, the political rebel is always one who is 
overwhelmed by his consciousness and simply cannot fail to act on its dictates; as 
Voegelin writes: “It is not a game to be played or not.”
247
  Havel writes similarly: 
“Whether, when, and how this investment will eventually produce dividends in the form 
of specific political changes is even less possible to predict.  But that, of course, is all part 
of living within the truth.  As an existential solution, it takes individuals back to the solid 
ground of their own identity; as politics it throws them into a game of chance where the 
stakes are all or nothing.  For this reason it is undertaken only by those for whom the 
former is worth risking the latter, or have come to the conclusion that there is no other 
way to conduct real politics. . . .”
248
   
 
Because the all-or-nothingness is inherent to both forms of rebellion it does not, at 
least ostensibly, assist in the aggregation of forms.  This is one of the complicating 
factors that leads to the sense of disorientation.  Thus attempts to categorize rebellions as 
either political or metaphysical must rely upon assessments of motivating factors, as the 
specifics of the all-or-nothingness vary dependent upon form.   
The inspiration for the metaphysical rebel’s all-or-nothingness is an ethical 
compromise.  That is, the system is constructed on the basis that there is no God or 
afterlife to aspire to.  All must be accomplished on earth, or it may as well be for nothing.  
“Everyone or no one” is facilitated through concentration camps, which are in turn 
facilitated by breaking ethical boundaries for the sake of the political aim.  For without 
the afterlife, all that exists is political aims.   
The exact opposite is true of the nature of the political rebel’s all-or-nothingness; 
his compromise in entirely materialistic.  He risks the life, limb, property, family and 
future for which he fights, but he risks nothing of his morality.  Unlike his antithesis, 
therefore, he will not arrive at “everyone or no one” in terms of a dogmatized system by 
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which all men must subscribe.  He may arrive at an attempt to liberate all men, but the 
simple act of liberation in and of itself does not impose anything on men save 
responsibility.  This attunement does not close reality from the experience of one’s 
conscience. 
 The institutional structures which foster the political rebel’s conception of 
“everyone or no one” appear in what Havel calls “parallel structures.”
249
  Political 
rebellion is here reaching its crescendo, and the application of consciousness to 
institutionalization becomes clear: institutions must simply allow for an attunement to 
consciousness.  “Everyone or no one” is a factor here, but only as a qualified reference to 
liberation.  It is only relative insofar as regimes govern and necessarily affect the whole 
of the societies they control.  Consequently the parallel structures of a society will have 
as their goal the liberation of everyone in an oppressed society.  The tenets of such 
liberation, however, never carry with it the enforcing demands of systemization.   Parallel 
structures are open in nature, reiterating their dichotomous relation to the intolerance of 
the metaphysical rebel’s constructions.  The institutional stipulations of the political rebel 
lack the imposing constraints of the metaphysical rebel.  Havel argues:  
“. . . parallel structures do not grow a priori out of a theoretical vision of systemic 
changes (there are no political sects involved), but from the aims of life and the authentic 
needs of real people.  In fact, all eventual changes in the system . . . have come about as it 
were de facto, from ‘below,’ because life compelled them to, not because they came 




In a similar tone, Havel explains the fusion of communist and noncommunist 
dissidents in Czechoslovakia in the early 1970s leading to Charter 77.  The passage 
                                                
249
 Ibid. pg. 100 
250
 Ibid. pg. 102 
 105 
reveals the ability of people lacking political similarities to operate within a shared 
institutional structure.  In his words:  
“These two groups gradually ‘fused’; they would come together or mingle in various 
ways, which was a rather symptomatic phenomenon: these people all had very different 
pasts, but the differences of opinion that had once separated them had long since ceased 
to be important . . . this was a time when we were beginning to walk upright again, a time 
of ‘exhaustion with exhaustion,’ a time when many different groups of people had had 
enough of their isolation and felt that, if something was going to change, they had to start 
looking beyond their own horizons.  Thus the ground was prepared for some kind of 
wider, common activity. . . . It was not easy for everyone – many had to suppress or 
overcome their ancient inner aversions – but everyone was able to do it, because we all 
felt that it was in common cause, and because something had taken shape here that was 
historically quite new: the embryo of a genuine social tolerance . . . [which] would be 
impossible to wipe out of the national memory. . . . It was not easy for many 
noncommunists to make that step, but for many communists it was difficult in the 
extreme.  It was a stepping out toward life, toward a genuine state of thinking about 
common matters, a transcendence of their own shadow, and the cost of doing so was 
saying goodbye forever to the principle of the ‘leading role of the party.’”
251
   
 
By transfiguring the role of political action from a formulation for life into a guard 
against such formulations, the parallel structure reveals a truth beyond the enclave of any 
particular political faction, and extends its applicability to any faction whose well being 
and identity had been suppressed by the enforcements of a systemic government.  Such a 
program removes political and philosophical differences from political order, instead 
allowing for a plurality of factions to exist within any particular society or regime.   
Parallel structures therefore argue for the ideas of openness and toleration.  
Whereas the Inquisitor closed the range of experience by assuming the responsibility of 
freedom for all of society upon himself, the process of openness allows men to discover 
responsibility for themselves.  The acceptance of individual responsibility, spread 
throughout a society, transfigures the conscious impetus of personal well-being into a 
prescription for social stability as well.  In Havel’s words: 
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“Historical experience teaches us that any genuinely meaningful point of departure in an 
individual’s life usually has an element of universality about it.  In other words, it is not 
something partial, accessible only to a restricted community, and not transferable to any 
other.  On the contrary, it must be potentially accessible to everyone; it must foreshadow 
a general solution and, thus, it is not just the expression of an introverted, self-contained 
responsibility that individuals have to and for themselves alone, but responsibility to and 
for the world.  Thus it would be quite wrong to understand the parallel structures and the 
parallel polis as a retreat into a ghetto and as an act of isolation, addressing itself only to 
the welfare of those who had decided on such a course, and who are indifferent to the rest.  
It would be wrong, in short, to consider it an essentially group solution that has nothing to 
do with the general solution.  Such a concept would, form the start, alienate the notion of 
living within the truth from its proper point of departure which is of concern for others, 
transforming it ultimately into just another more sophisticated version of ‘living within 
the lie. . . . ’ Pato ka used to say that the most interesting thing about responsibility is that 
we carry it with us everywhere.  That means that responsibility is ours, that we must 
accept it and grasp it here, now, in this place in time and space where the Lord has set us 
down, and that we cannot lie our way out of it by moving somewhere else. . . . 
Christianity is an example of an opposite way out: it is a point of departure for me here 
and now – but only because anyone, anywhere, at any time, may avail themselves of it.  
In other words, the parallel polis points beyond itself and only makes sense as an act of 
deepening one’s responsibility to and for the whole world, as a way of discovering the 




This responsibility implies the acceptance of truth as “beyond” material influence.  It is 
inspired by the noetic form of reason described by Voegelin’s theory of consciousness; a 
reason informed by the transcendent ground of truth.  The consequence of the attunement 
to the divine ground counteracts against tendencies toward immanent fulfillment.  By 
invalidating the idea of gnostic systemization, the placement of the ground as “beyond” 
simultaneously validates the responsibility that, lacking such an attunement, would 
appear absurd.  Havel writes: 
“. . . the kind of hope I often think about . . . I understand above all as a state of mind, 
not a state of the world.  Either we have hope within us or we don’t; it is a dimension of 
the soul, and it’s not essentially dependent on some particular observation of the world or 
estimate of the situation.  Hope is not a prognostication.  It is an orientation of the spirit, 
an orientation of the heart; it transcends the world that is immediately experienced, and is 
anchored somewhere beyond its horizons.  I don’t think you can explain it as a mere 
derivative of something here, of some movement, or of some favorable signs in the world.  
I feel that its deepest roots are in the transcendental, just as the roots of human 
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The apolitical structure of Havel’s parallel structures finds its organizational 
impetus in openness.  The closure of any articulation of this experience facilitates the 
formulation of a system which enforces a particular interpretation of that experience upon 
man.  Hence, the parallel structures developing in response to a gnostic system are, as 
necessitated by this opposition, tolerant and open in an attempt to correlate experiential 
reality with the dictates of consciousness.  As this experience is grounded in a 
transcendental realm which defies precise description, the manifestation of this 
experience into political reality takes the form of tolerance and openness.  
 Havel therefore describes dissent movements as “explicitly defensive movements: 
they exist to defend human beings and the genuine aims of life against the aims of the 
system.”
254
  It is not the task of such men to construct systems in opposition to an extant 
system but merely to rebel against such an idea.  The task of the dissident, therefore, is 
simply to point out the encroachment of the system upon the demands of life.  Dissidents 
do not construct systems to replace the ones against which they are rebelling.  At the 
moment they undertake such a task, they have overstepped the bounds of political 
rebellion and embarked upon a course of metaphysical rebellion; it is this quest for 
system construction which distinguishes the two. 
 The work of dissidents in the construction of parallel structures is therefore 
merely to provide a conduit through which a system’s obfuscations can become evident, 
and through which shared experiences of oppression can be illuminated for what they are.  
Havel has perceptively written that “what is true about the will of the regime . . . is not 
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necessarily true of the real spiritual potential of our community.”
255
  The work of 
dissidents and parallel structures, therefore, emerges as a cultural underground running 
against the propagations of a system.  Through such an underground, prolific but 
suppressed sensations of political oppression and injustice can gain momentum.  Through 
the dissemination of this experience, men’s own reservations find reinforcement and 
perhaps the courage to act.  
IV 
Havel defines this underground movement as “nothing more and nothing less than 
a culture which, for various reasons will not, cannot or may not reach out to the public 
through the media which fall under state control.”
256
  Therefore the underground emerges 
in cultural movements through mediums evasive of state censorship.  Literature, music 
and philosophical discourse provide ways in which dissidents can bring their grievances 
to a forum for the sharing of ideas.  Through the dissemination of ideas, society can 
realize the prolific nature of discontent and inspire the quest for political change.  For 
example, in discussing Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim’s Occult Philosophy, 
Havel relates his understanding of it to Michael Jackson’s famous song, Thriller, saying 
“I only feel that chance – that great poet – is stammering an indistinct message about the 
desperate state of the world.”
257
  Through the dissemination of such a lamentation, the 
repressed sensation of desperation gains momentum as men begin to understand that the 
sensation of reality being obfuscated is not exclusive to their particular experience. 
 Havel’s own plays influenced the parallel culture in Czechoslovakia.  A 
performance of The Beggar’s Opera spread sentiments of disaffection throughout 
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Czechoslovakia’s underground culture.  Ji í Voskovec wrote passionately of its evocative 
appeal: “. . . the whirlwind of the Great Communal Nonsense; on this tiny planet, it 
attacks us all, regardless of political or other affiliation.”
258
  Indeed, Voskovec’s 
impressions were shared with colleagues.  Edá Kriseová writes: 
“In an atmosphere without drama and without narrative, something was starting to 
happen.  People once again showed signs of life.  The communal experience in the 
theater gave strength to many people who were soon to become signatories and 
spokespeople for Charter 77.  That free act brought liberation to everyone who 




The power of this shared experience gained momentum in the parallel culture.  
Recalling his first meeting with Ivan Jirous, when he first heard songs by Czech 
underground artists such as the Plastic People and DG 307, Havel said: “there was 
disturbing magic in the music, and a kind of inner warning.  Here was something serious 
and genuine, an internally free articulation of an existential experience that everyone who 
had not become completely obtuse must understand.”
260
  A short time later, Jirous and 
nineteen of his comrades were arrested.  The occurrence illuminated the duplicity of the 
Czech regime, as Havel writes:  
“What was happening here was not a settling of accounts with political enemies, who to 
a certain extent were prepared for the risks they were taking.  This case had nothing 
whatsoever to do with a struggle between two competing political cliques.  It was 
something far worse: an attack by the totalitarian system on life itself, on the very essence 
of human freedom and integrity.  The objects of this attack were not veterans of old 
political battles; they had no political past, or even any well-defined political positions.  
They were simply young people who wanted to live in their own way, to make music 
they liked, to sing what they wanted to sing, to live in harmony with themselves, and to 
express themselves in a truthful way.  A judicial attack against them, especially one that 
went unnoticed, could become the precedent for something truly evil: the regime could 
well start locking up everyone who thought independently and who expressed himself 
independently, even if he did so only in private.  So these arrests were genuinely 
alarming: they were an attack on the spiritual and intellectual freedom of man, 
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camouflaged as an attack on criminality, and therefore designed to gain support from a 
disinformed public.  Here power had unintentionally revealed its own most proper 
intention: to make life entirely the same, to surgically remove from it everything that was 
even slightly different, everything that was highly individual, everything that stood out, 




Because Czech society had been inculcated with a prolific but underground dissident 
movement and parallel culture, the arrests inspired questions  instead of becoming a 
mechanism for the silencing of them.   Havel took it upon himself to incite support for the 
musicians.  He was joined by other intellectuals of various ideological affiliations, such 
as Ji í Nemec and Jan Pato ka, making the arrests a formative event in the movement 
towards the development of Charter 77: “The people who gathered outside the courtroom 
were a prefiguration of Charter 77.  The same atmosphere that dominated then, of 
equality, solidarity, conviviality, togetherness, and willingness to help each other, an 
atmosphere evoked by a common cause and a common threat, was also the atmosphere 
around Charter 77. . . .”
262
  
 This movement was not without its risks.  As stated, all-or-nothingness is inherent 
to political rebellion.  The movement forced the government to respond accordingly, 
which meant either to suppress or assimilate resistance, and the modus operandi of 
totalitarian systems is suppression.  Havel was himself arrested three times, and detained 
on numerous other occasions.  Pato ka died in prison of a heart attack in 1977, after 
eleven hours of police interrogation.
263
  For such costs, the movement was not 
spontaneously pandemic.  As late as 1987, Janus Bugajski had noted that Charter 77 had 
not gained widespread support.  He writes: 
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“Powerful socioeconomic pressures and sociopsychological factors that make people 
fearful of political involvement continue to operate in Czechoslovak society.  
Autonomous activities are widely perceived as counterproductive, because they could 
result in more severe across-the-board repressions and ultimately threaten living 
standards.  A section of the population even seems to resist Charter 77 for posing a 
menace to the relative tranquility, however much they may ultimately support its aims.  
In addition, many ordinary citizens view with suspicion any movement that involves 
former Communist officials, making little distinction between variants of socialism.  As a 
result, the majority of the population remains passive and avoids involvement in 




   But because the movement was carried out in secretive circles and samizdat 
publications, the explosion into revolution came as a shock to many people.  The 
ineptitude of the government to stop the movement only became apparent with the 
widespread realization that the state was, infact, incapable of overcoming the societal will.  
Bernard Wheaton and Zden k Kavan illustrate how the Velvet Revolution was the climax 
of a perhaps unforeseeable crescendo of dissent.  The impetus of it derived not from the 
identifiable catalysts to social scientists – the effects socioeconomic factors on 
psychological dispositions – but from the surmounting urge to don political responsibility 
as individuals.  They write: 
“The collapse of the regime came as a surprise to many people who, for reasons 
connected with the general psychological and social conditions, had never challenged it.  
The impact of the evaporation of fear was of critical importance, and the longer the 
government failed to react, the more self-strengthening the movement became.  The 
students and CF [Civic Forum] opened a door to mass action during the revolution, 
enabling people to throw off their fear and inspiring them to demonstrate on a massive 
scale that finally helped make them aware of the power of the collective will.  This 
awareness had been absent in the two decades of the normalized regime, where the 





Consequently, the Velvet Revolution was achieved without the use of violence.  The 
insurmountability of the parallel movement disclosed even to the government its own 
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incompetency.  Although achieved through the price of personal sacrifices and hardships 
to particular rebels such as Havel and Pato ka, the Revolution itself of 1989 was carried 
out peacefully.  Wheaton and Kavan note that this:  
“. . . had much to do with the character and role of the dissident movement.  It had a 
relatively long history, and, though participants were few and relatively isolated from the 
population, had laid down extensive networks. . . . the Czech dissidents had contacts and 
sympathizers as high as the upper echelons of the party, [and] linkages between 
dissidents and nondissidents were established without difficulty, as most activists and 
sympathizers were from what the Slovak clerical right described as the “Prague 
intellectual ghetto.”  This was not large, everybody knowing or knowing of everybody 




Hence the Velvet Revolution occurred in a manner consistent with the theoretical 
sketch developed in Havel’s essays.  The dissident movement founded itself on a 
defiance of ideology and promulgated its ideas through cultural networks – mediums 
through which disaffection could be evidently yet discretely detected.  The movement 
whittled away at the dominance of the regime by continually forcing it to suppress 
apparently innocent people – students, musicians and thinkers – who were obviously 
inspired by a sense of self and whose actions carried benign, even remedial, social 
consequences.  The conscious collective realization of the regime’s oppressive nature 
loosened fears and, as a surprise to many, swiftly erupted into peaceful revolution forcing 
the government’s capitulation.  The regime came under attack from all sides and all from 
factions; all grieved by a general suppression of consciousness and of identity.  It could 
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V 
This example suggests that the tenets of truth cannot be annihilated but merely 
obfuscated, that the suppression of conscious reality for the achievement of political ends 
finds its greatest enemies in the souls of men brave enough to adhere to their consicences.  
Governments can burn books, but they can never keep them from being written.  As 
Havel writes: 
“. . . in spite of all the tasks that were constantly assigned to it, literature would keep on 
doing only what it wanted.  And if by chance it did not make an effort to carry out its 
assigned tasks, it was invariably the worse for it.  Its only hope, no less so under the 
conditions of ‘parallelism’ (and especially then – that is why I chose them!) is to ignore 
the tasks anyone would assign to it, no matter how good his intentions, and go on doing 




If it is the innate ability of literature to do what it wants, then it is probable that it will 
indeed become corrupted along with the corruption of a society.  I am not arguing that 
literature, art, and a cultural insight magically correct the woes of an afflicted society.  
Infact, Voegelin refers to the German literary disposition in the twentieth century as 
“highly concentrated imbecility” in part responsible for the condition of that society.
268
  
Yet the concentration of stupidity is the facile account of a corrupting society.  Literature, 
much like the men who write it, is innately disposed to be either ingenuous or duplicitous.  
Its magic relies in its ability to influence, yet the ways in which it transfigures the world 
is always dependent upon the character of its authors  for which there exists no magical 
panacea. 
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Conclusion: Climbing Golgotha 
 The foregoing analysis has argued that the term rebellion applies to two ostensibly 
similar actions that stem from juxtaposing inspirations.  Rebellion implies the abnegation 
of one form of power, and the acceptance of another.  Through it can be detected the 
bounds of the authority to which men are willing or able to submit; political action and 
reorganization expresses both the grievances men raise concerning the nature of existence, 
and the extent to which men can will changes to that existence. 
 But that existence is complicated; in it are involved laws of two distinct 
authorities, worldly and divine.  We are obliged to the divine, but to the worldly only 
insofar as they are themselves in accord with divine sanctions.  Political action is only a 
viable mechanism for addressing grievances raised by a political malefactor that has 
disturbed the balance between worldly and transcendent laws.  This form of political 
action, political rebellion, implies the abnegation of a political power because of its 
oppressive nature.  This action leads into the restoration of an equitable balance of power 
between a society and its government. 
Political action inspired by a grievance that transcends politics is not political 
rebellion.  Although such action involves action in the political sphere, it is inspired by a 
grievance against the general nature of existence as a human being regardless of political 
circumstance.  The metaphysical rebel’s action is differentiated from the action of the 
political rebel because it is executed against an innocent political actor; it is a tyrannical 
and criminal encroachment against the rights of someone who is simply performing his 
just role within society as ruler.  But because it is motivated by a grievance, and executed 
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as an attempt to better the nature of existence, its act of refusal relates it to political 
rebellion.  
Not only the motivations, but the consequences of the metaphysical rebel’s action 
distinguish it from political action inspired by political rebellion.  The action of the 
political rebel leads to a political situation that improves the given political conditions by 
restoring the authenticity that had been vitiated by oppression.  As the rebellion against 
an oppressive political authority, it restores to the individual some right, liberty or 
property formerly restricted to them by the actions of their government.  It implies a 
restoration of dignity, integrity and sense of personal value usurped by a governing 
authority.   
The action of the metaphysical rebel, contrarily, does not lead into an equitable 
power balance between the members and rulers of a society.  It proclaims this end, but is 
aimed at the furtherance of a particular interest.  The consequent situation is of an 
unbalanced power structure in which one faction usurps from the others for private gain; 
metaphysical rebellion creates the very situation which validates the action inherent to 
political rebellion: oppression.  
But both the consequences of the political rebel and the metaphysical rebel are 
derived from the disruption of political order.  The two acts have therefore come to share 
a familial structure within our discourse; the act of renouncing one form of authority for 
the installation of another binds the two forms of rebellions.  And perhaps they should be 
so understood; rebellion represents the normative extremes of political action between 
which the inspirations for political order must necessarily be bound.  The act of political 
rebellion, in creating an equitable balance of power within a society creates the situation 
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which can only be changed by a decline into metaphysical rebellion.  In respecting the 
freedoms of one another we in turn abstain from the indulgence of injustice for the sake 
of personal gain.  The condition of selflessness, however, is the condition from which the 
temptations of selfishness arise; the only essential change from being selfless is to be 
more selfish.  So as political rebellion restores the worth of a people, the only essential 
change from it is toward the corruption fostered by metaphysical rebellion.  In this way 
the existence of one condition encourages the arrival of the other, if only because they are 
the experiential limits of their motivating ideals. 
Rebellion is therefore something different than simply the attempt to replace one 
power with another; in it is represented the very bounds of human action and potential, 
beyond which men cannot reach.  It symbolizes the culmination of dissent; following it is 
the return to the humdrum of mundane life  to the acceptance of the given order of 
things.    Political rebellion institutes an order that is as open to the transcendent ground 
as a political order can be; metaphysical rebellion creates an order that is as closed to that 
ground as a political order can be.  Thus in political rebellion is represented the human 
embodiment of that which is good and decent about existence, and just that.  
Metaphysical rebellion discloses the nature of that which is essentially and only evil.  
Between these bounds man can be observed to ebb and flow; but action beyond them is 
impossible.  Rebellion occurs at that point where man begins to be pulled mysteriously 
away from one antipode and towards the other; it is the forthright attempt to grapple with 
and embody the essence represented at that extreme, and to forsake forever the balance of 
what is. 
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This point brings us back to Dostoevsky’s offerings on rebellion, which 
culminates with the dialogue between Christ and the Inquisitor; he embodies these human 
limits to action in these characters.  Christ is the political rebel acting on inherent 
goodness, and the Inquisitor is the metaphysical rebel acting on inherent evilness; in the 
two are the ideals between which humanity is torn: “God and the devil are fighting there 
and the battlefield is the heart man.”       
The structure of the dialogue between Christ and the Inquisitor implies the nature 
of the relationship of the good and evil entities involved, that in the unceasing go-around 
of human existence there is a correct action towards which we ought to be directed, even 
if even the best of us never will always be so.  It implies a desired end, made unattainable 
by a fickle human nature that can at best only come close to it.  It illustrates that 
humanity is endowed with the predilection for both ends, that it is perpetually strung 
between them, but that each end has opposing consequences for both the political orders 
and the personal experiences of men.  It leads us to conclude that the best political order 
is therefore the one that leaves the door to transcendence open, that it is simply the one 
that does not dogmatize an ideal and replace what is good about humanity with a 
paradigm for action, that the best political order is the one that does not vitiate the human 
experience. 
Dostoevsky discloses this end through the one-sided structure of the dialogue 
between the two characters.  Try as he might have, the Inquisitor’s attempt to enforce a 
change in human nature itself could not have succeeded, as the bounds of human nature 
represent the limits of moral obligations and therefore of conscionable action.  Ivan’s 
“new man that might overstep the moral boundaries of the old slave-man” proposes the 
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changing of a static boundary defined by transcendent obligations that are unaffected by 
worldly inclinations.  Because this boundary is an indelible limit to action, the truth 
represented therein speaks for itself; the inability to negotiate from its grasp is implacable.  
It speaks to men through their conscience and through their being conscious of it.  It is 
not, therefore, subject to being transfigured through eloquent or convincing argument; but 
this does not mean that imperfect haughty men cannot rebel against it. 
 The Inquisitor’s design, which we have already developed, represents this 
rebellion.  It represents all that man might defiantly do to institute himself as a god, but it 
is dependent upon the creation of this “new man that might overstep the boundaries of the 
old slave-man.”  This particular yearning represents the single great obstacle to the 
Inquisitor’s design: He may constitute any political institution that he can willy-nilly 
contrive, but he cannot create the man that his paradigm demands.  The man exists as a 
given; that given-ness and concrete existence as man is the natural renunciation of the 
Inquisitor’s temptation. 
 Christ’s role in the dialogue represents this renunciation.  Through Him 
Dostoevsky reinforces the argument that human nature is defined by the human 
conscience, and that this qualification limits human capacity.  Dostoevsky’s Christ argues 
that man as he exists represents the correction to the error of the Inquisitor.   
 Because the nature of man is static, Christ’s rebellion manifests contrary to the 
manifestation of the Inquisitor.  Whereas the Inquisitor contrives a system by which his 
grievance can be theoretically rectified, Christ’s rebellion is not defined by any system 
developed in response to the arguments made by the Inquisitor.  Instead he passes 
through the dialogue in silent patient defiance:   
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“When the Inquisitor ceased speaking he waited some time for his Prisoner to answer him.  
His silence weighed upon him.  He saw that the Prisoner had listened intently and quietly 
all the time, looking gently in his face and evidently not wishing to reply.  The old man 
longed for Him to say something, however bitter and terrible.  But he suddenly 
approached the old man in silence and softly kissed him on his bloodless aged lips.  That 




An interpretation of Christ’s silence leads into the political consequences it.  An 
understanding of it is reliant upon the biblical account of Christ’s trial and death, which 
reinforces Christ’s rebuttal to the Inquisitor  but offers a bit more: 
“And when he was accused of the chief priests and elders, he answered nothing.  Then 
said Pilate unto him, Hearest thou not how many things they witness against thee?  And 




In both accounts Christ refuses to quibble with a worldly authority that has called his 
auspices into question.  Only through the biblical account, however, can we garner a 
sense of that silence as representative of a truth that does not stoop to defending itself: it 
is the truth, it needs no defense: it is what is.  The Bible teaches that thee days after men 
had forced Him to climb up to Golgotha, scourged, mocked, tortured and crucified Him, 
Christ illustrated for them the nature of His inimitable truth, saying on Easter Sunday: “I 
am with you always, even unto the end of the world.”
271
  He could be silent while bearing 
his cross because the arguments He might make could not affect the unchangeable nature 
of the truth He knew.   
 If Christ’s silent truth is that which is actually true, how can we reconcile our 
political demands with that truth?  The question might appear at first somewhat 
paradoxical, as all political orders are dependent upon some type of system or paradigm 
by which those order’s imperatives and priorities are determined.  How, therefore, can 
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man arrive a political order or system which is, effectively, non-systemic – a political 
order that is actually ordered, but not reliant upon any particular system for determining 
that order?  Christ’s silence suggests a qualified answer to these questions, which Havel 
has captured succinctly: “By itself, the law can never create anything better.”
272
 
  Liberal and democratic institutions are the concrete manifestations of this answer, 
as the institutions wrought through Havel’s Velvet Revolution suggest; the tolerance 
contrived therein provides man with the opportunity to personally discover the 
transcendent ground of truth – it does not formulate this truth for him, rather it simply 
protects his ability to attune himself to it.  But this institutional design is a qualified 
answer to our questions; dogmatized liberalism is the system of the Grand Inquisitor.  By 
paying careful attention to the qualifications of political revolution in liberal thought, as 
drawn out by John Locke in his Second Treatise on Government, we find the balance 
drawn between liberalism and the use of law.    
 Locke’s theory makes it necessary that revolutionary political change be catalyzed 
by the precondition of an oppressive political regime, one that has infringed on men’s 
“lives, liberties . . . and property.”  Concordantly, this scheme defines the sole prerogative 
of laws to maintain men’s individual responsibilities for these things; laws can not be 
employed as a tool, used by a political actor for the aim of worldly affluence.  In Locke 
freedom and the law go hand-in-hand; laws find their place in encouraging men to respect 
the freedoms of one another, even if this means forsaking some aspirations of their own.  
Voegelin illustrates how a non-systemic political order is balanced between integrity and 
accommodation, but suggests that Locke’s paradigm is reliant upon men willing to abide 
by freedom’s qualifications: 
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“. . . democracy cannot work if its members have principles and want to realize them . . . 
every society that works is based on courtesy, on compromises, on concession to other 
people.  Whoever has a fixed idea and wants this to be carried into effect, that is to say, 
whoever interprets freedom of speech and freedom of conscience to the effect that the 
society should behave in the way he considers right, is not qualified to be a citizen of a 
democracy.  The political interplay of every society . . . is based on the fact that one 
thinks a lot about what the others do, but does not say it; that one is always aware that in 
the society there is more than one good to achieve, not only the good of freedom, but also 
the good of security, the good of welfare, and that if I specialize in one or other of these 
goods, I could thereby bring the whole society into disorder, because I could destroy the 
balance between the realization of goods on which the society is based.  I could even 
destroy it if I kept advocating the good that is my hobbyhorse and I want to get accepted 
and realized at this time and if I continually forced it on the others, for they will then 




Man must reconcile his own needs and the needs of his society, and understand that this 
harmony is a precondition for his freedom.  It is an observation whose realization is 
reliant upon the foundation of men willing to share, willing to live together in a society 
and eager to work hard in order to make that society great.  It is an observation that 
echoes the plea of Alexis de Tocqueville, who understood that the rulers of his time 
“sought only to use men in order to make things great;” and wished: 
“that they would try a little more to make great men; that they would set less value on the 
work, and more upon the workman; that they would never forget that a nation cannot 
long remain strong when every man belonging to it is individually weak; and that no 
form of combination of social polity has yet been devised to make an energetic people 
out of a community of pusillanimous and enfeebled citizens.”
274
 
   
 These great men are not inculcated through political devices, but only through an 
awareness of and an attunement to the ground that defines the parameters to such devices.  
De Tocqueville is arguing for a political scheme that does not enforce its desires upon 
men, but for one that allows men to be conscious of their own obligations to themselves 
and to their societies.  His great men are not dependant upon any renovation to human 
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nature but upon a realization of the full capacity of that nature.  De Tocqueville dreams of 
a practicable man, one that need not overstep the boundaries of man as he is to realize his 
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